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by 
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Advisor: Lin Peng 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine investor attention and its impact on 
corporate events and asset prices using a Google search-based measure of investor attention. 
Chapter 1 This chapter investigates investor attention patterns and its determinants. I 
document that investor attention displays strong seasonality. It is significantly lower on Fridays 
and in summer months. I find that investor attention increases significantly following earnings 
announcements and macro news releases, and the effect is stronger for large firms. When faced 
with both firm-specific and market-wide information shocks, investors’ attention response to 
firm-specific information attenuates and their trading behavior is also affected. My evidence 
suggests that investors actively allocate their attention in response to information shocks and 
prioritize their information processing to large firms and systematic shocks, as suggested by 
models of rational inattention. 
Chapter 2 This chapter analyzes investor attention around merger announcements and its 
impact on price reactions and investor trading activity. I find that (1) investor attention to target 
firms increase significantly during the pre-announcement period, (2) investor attention to both 
acquirer and target firms increases on the announcement day, but increases more for the target 
firms and large deals; (3) stock return responses and abnormal trading volume are less 
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pronounced when investor attention is low. In particular, stock returns to of targets are less 
positive when investor attention is lower. Overall, my results suggest that investors anticipate 
merger announcements and that investor attention affects how investors incorporate information 
into asset prices.  
Chapter 3 This chapter examines the impact of investor attention on the relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and stock return. I find that idiosyncratic volatility positively 
predicts future stock return when investor attention is high. When investor attention is low, the 
predictive power is insignificant. The stock returns for stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility 
and high investor attention do not reverse in the long-run. The evidence is consistent with the 



















Looking back at my Ph.D. studies, I feel very fortunate to have had the support from so many 
great people, and I would like to thank every one of them from the bottom of my heart. 
To my advisor, Professor Lin Peng. She has been an incredible mentor, guiding me in every 
stage of my dissertation and encouraging me to go out of my comfort zone to challenge myself.  
Without the feedback, motivation, and support from her, I would not have developed these 
research questions.  
To my committee member, Professor Donal Byard and Professor Liuren Wu. Their expertise and 
suggestions are truly valuable to this dissertation.  
To Professor Armen Hovakimian. Thanks for being available all the time when I had questions 
about research, teaching, and job market struggles.  
To Professor Jianming Ye and Professor Joseph Weintrop. Thanks very much for the opportunity 
to pursue my Ph.D. study in this program. It is a milestone in my life, and I wish I could be 
someone like them to offer life-changing opportunities to others in the future.  
To Professor Amber Anand, Xi Dong, Sebastiano Manzan, Jun Wang, Rui Yao, Dexin Zhou. 
Thanks for the advice and support during my job search.  
To all the professors who provided excellent courses and guidance: Professor Linda Allen, Jay 
Dahya, Armen Hovakimian, Lin Peng, Robert Schwarts, Kishore Tandon, Jeremy Bertomu, Jun 
Wang, and Liuren Wu. Their curriculum had broadened and deepened my understanding of 
financial studies and constantly challenged me. 
vii 
 
To Professor Karl Lang and Leslie De Jesus. Thanks for the hard work to run the Ph.D. program 
efficiently and make our life easy.  
To my fellow Ph.D. students, notably Sila Alan, Yuan Feng, Saeed Ghasseminejad, Richard 
Herron, Huajing Hu, Grace Kim, Karolina Krystiniak, Katarzyna Platt, Viktoriya Staneva, Chih-
Huei Su, Yan Yan, among others. Their friendship is a valuable asset for me, both personally and 
professionally. My special thanks go to Karolina Krystiniak. It is very fortunate to have her to 
share all the dissertation and job market struggle and to work on topics of common interests.    
To my husband. He has been the greatest support for me. Thanks for sharing with me this 
amazing experience, and I look forward to moving on to the next phase of life together.  
To my father. Thanks for always believing in me and encouraging me to seize the opportunities 
that opened up to me. Whenever I feel down and go to him, he has a way to cheer me up and 
make me feel confident again.  
To my mother. She has been the source of endless love, concern, support, and strength for me.    






List of Tables ............................................................................................................................................... xi 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................................................ xiii 
List of Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ xiii 
1 Chapter 1: Investor Attention: Seasonal Patterns and Endogenous Allocations ................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Literature review ........................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 Data and variable descriptions ...................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Descriptive analysis of investor attention ................................................................................... 10 
1.4.1 Day of week pattern ............................................................................................................ 10 
1.4.2 Month of year pattern .......................................................................................................... 12 
1.4.3 The dynamic relation between attention, trading volume, returns, and volatility ............... 14 
1.5 Attention and information shocks ............................................................................................... 15 
1.5.1 Attention response to firm-specific news ............................................................................ 15 
1.5.2 Attention response to systematic news ............................................................................... 17 
1.5.3 Attention allocation across different types of information.................................................. 18 
1.5.4 Multivariate Tests ............................................................................................................... 20 
1.5.5 Attention allocation and trading volume ............................................................................. 23 
1.6 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 24 
2 Chapter 2: Investor inattention and merger announcements ............................................................... 47 
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 47 
ix 
 
2.2 Literature review ......................................................................................................................... 52 
2.3 Data ............................................................................................................................................. 54 
2.3.1 Measure of investor attention .............................................................................................. 54 
2.3.2 Sample selection ................................................................................................................. 54 
2.4 The timing and magnitude of investor attention around merger announcements ....................... 56 
2.4.1 Univariate analysis .............................................................................................................. 56 
2.4.2 Multivariate analysis ........................................................................................................... 58 
2.5 Cross-section of investor attention to merger announcements ................................................... 60 
2.6 Market reaction to merger announcements ................................................................................. 61 
2.6.1 Announcement return .......................................................................................................... 61 
2.6.2 Trading volume ................................................................................................................... 63 
2.7 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 63 
3 Chapter 3: Investor attention, idiosyncratic volatility, and stock returns............................................ 76 
3.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 76 
3.2 Literature review ......................................................................................................................... 79 
3.3 Data ............................................................................................................................................. 81 
3.3.1 Measure of investor attention .............................................................................................. 81 
3.3.2 Measure of idiosyncratic volatility...................................................................................... 81 
3.3.3 Other variables .................................................................................................................... 82 
3.3.4 Summary statistics .............................................................................................................. 82 
3.4 Results ......................................................................................................................................... 83 
x 
 
3.4.1 Univariate portfolio-level analysis ...................................................................................... 83 
3.4.2 Bivariate portfolio-level analysis ........................................................................................ 84 
3.4.3 Fama-Macbeth regression analysis ..................................................................................... 85 
3.4.4 Horizons of the predictive power ........................................................................................ 86 
3.5 Investigating the underlying mechanisms ................................................................................... 86 
3.5.1 Long-run return difference .................................................................................................. 86 
3.5.2 Establishing causality: dependent sort ................................................................................ 87 
3.6 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 88 

















List of Tables 
Table 1.1 Sample description ...................................................................................................................... 31 
Table 1.2 Summary statistics ...................................................................................................................... 31 
Table 1.3 Abnormal attention patterns: day-of-week ................................................................................. 32 
Table 1.4 Abnormal attention patterns: month of year effect ..................................................................... 33 
Table 1.5 Vector Autoregression (VAR) model of attention, turnover, return, and absolute return .......... 34 
Table 1.6 Attention responses to earnings announcements ........................................................................ 35 
Table 1.7 Attention responses to macro news ............................................................................................. 36 
Table 1.8 Attention response to earnings announcements: the effect of macro news................................. 37 
Table 1.9 Attention response to earnings announcements: the effect of important macro news ................ 38 
Table 1.10 Regression analysis: the determinants of abnormal attention ................................................... 39 
Table 1.11 Regression Analysis of Attention response to earnings announcements .................................. 40 
Table 1.12 Trading volume (AbnTurnover) on earnings announcement days with and without macro news 
announcements ............................................................................................................................................ 41 
Table 2.1 Summary statistics ...................................................................................................................... 65 
Table 2.2 Univariate analysis of investor attention around major corporate events ................................... 66 
Table 2.3 Multivariate analysis of the timing and magnitude of investor attention around merger 
announcements ............................................................................................................................................ 67 
Table 2.4 Cross-section of investor attention to AttTarget ......................................................................... 68 
Table 2.5 Univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on AttTarget announcement day return 69 
Table 2.6 Investor attention and stock return of AttTarget ......................................................................... 70 
Table 2.7 Univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on announcement return for AttTarget . 71 
Table 2.8 Univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on trading volume for AttTarget .......... 72 
Table 2.9 Investor attention and trading volume of AttTarget .................................................................... 73 
xii 
 
Table 3.1 Summary statistics ...................................................................................................................... 89 
Table 3.2 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention or IVOL: equal weighted 
portfolios ..................................................................................................................................................... 90 
Table 3.3 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention or IVOL: value weighted 
portfolios ..................................................................................................................................................... 91 
Table 3.4 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention and IVOL: equal-weighted 
portfolios ..................................................................................................................................................... 92 
Table 3.5 Fama-Macbeth regression: predict one-week ahead returns ....................................................... 93 
Table 3.6 Fama-Macbeth regression: predict one-, two-, three-, four-week ahead returns ........................ 94 
Table 3.7 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention and lag idiosyncratic volatility: 





List of Figures  
Figure 1.1 AbnAttention to American International Group Inc.(AIG) ....................................................... 26 
Figure 1.2 AbnAttention to Apple Inc.(AAPL) .......................................................................................... 26 
Figure 1.3 Attention patterns: day-of-week effect ...................................................................................... 27 
Figure 1.4 Attention response to earnings announcements: day-of-week effect ........................................ 28 
Figure 1.5 Attention patterns: month-of-year effect ................................................................................... 29 
Figure 1.6 Attention response to earnings announcements:  month of the year effect ............................... 30 
Figure 3.1 Difference in return between high and low IVOL portfolios in the highest AbnAttention 
quintile ........................................................................................................................................................ 95 
 
List of Appendix 
Appendix 1.1 Variable definition................................................................................................................ 42 
Appendix 1.2 U.S. News Announcements .................................................................................................. 43 
Appendix 1.3 AbnAttention on days with and without earnings announcement, excluding weekends and 
macro announcement days .......................................................................................................................... 45 
Appendix 1.4 AbnAttention on days with and without macro news announcement .................................. 46 
Appendix 2.1 Variable definitions .............................................................................................................. 74 




1 Chapter 1: Investor Attention: Seasonal Patterns and Endogenous Allocations 
1.1 Introduction 
Investors have a limited amount of time and cognitive resources to process information. Many 
papers provide evidence on the impact of investor attention on asset prices, investor trading 
behavior, and firm behavior (e.g., Barber and Odean (2008), Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2011)). These papers rely on implicit assumptions about investor 
attention. For example, Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) argue that investor attention to a 
firm’s earnings announcement is lower on days with multiple announcements, and Dellavigna 
and Pollet (2009) assume that investor attention is lower on Fridays. These papers find that 
earnings announced on Fridays and days with many earnings announcements indeed have lower 
immediate stock market reactions and greater post announcement drifts. Hong and Yu (2009) 
argue that both institutional investors and retail investors have “gone fishin’” in the summer, 
which leads to a significant reduction in trading volume and returns. While these papers 
document important asset pricing anomalies that are consistent with the hypothesized effect of 
investor inattention, there is no direct evidence that supports their assumptions about investor 
attention.  
This chapter fills this gap in the literature and directly examines the patterns of attention and its 
determinants. Using an attention measure based on daily Google search volume for individual 
stocks’ ticker symbols, I investigate the following four questions. First, what are the time series 
properties of investor attention? Second, how do investors change the level of attention allocated 
to stocks in response to information shocks? Third, how do investors allocate their limited 
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attention among different types of information? Fourth, how do investors’ attention allocation 
decision affect their trading behavior? 
I first study the time-series pattern of investor attention and find that it exhibits strong 
seasonality: investor attention to individual stocks is significantly lower on Friday, in summer 
months (July and August). The pattern is robust after controlling for the number of firm-specific 
news announcements, suggesting that this seasonal pattern is not simply driven by variations in 
information volume. Thus, my evidence strongly supports the conjectures of investor attention 
made by Hong and Yu (2009) and Dellavigna and Pollet (2009). 
I then examine how investors allocate their attention to stocks in response to information 
shocks. I focus on firm-specific information shocks as captured by earnings announcements and 
29 important macro news announcements. I find that attention to stocks increases by 5.72 
percentage points on days of the firm’s earnings announcements and 0.74 percentage points on 
days of macro announcements. The results suggest that investors actively respond to both macro 
news and firm-specific information shocks by allocating more attention to stocks. Furthermore, I 
find that while the attention response to information exists for all firms, the effect is stronger for 
large firms. This result is consistent with Peng (2005), who shows that, since large firms 
contribute more to the uncertainty of a portfolio, it is more effective for an investor to allocate 
more attention to large firms.    
I further study how investors allocate their limited attention among multiple sources of 
information. Peng and Xiong (2006) argue that investors with limited attention rationally process 
more market-wide information than firm-specific information, especially when faced with large 
macroeconomic uncertainties. The intuition is that, given limited attention, it is more effective to 
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concentrate on common factors that have a larger impact on the portfolio uncertainty. I test this 
theoretical prediction by comparing the attention to quarterly earnings announcements made on 
days with macro news announcements and days without macro news announcements. Consistent 
with the prediction, I find that earnings announcements made on days without major macro news 
releases trigger an increase in attention of 10.56 percentage points and those announced on days 
with macro releases only increase attention by 8.97 percentage points; the difference is 
statistically significant.  
This chapter contributes to the literature not only by confirming the key assumptions made by 
previous work but also by providing new evidence that sharpens our understanding of the 
determinants of investor attention. Investors actively increase their attention to stocks in response 
to information shocks and allocate attention across different stocks and different sources of 
information in a pattern that is consistent with predictions of theoretical models. The results 
provide insight on how investor attention can affect asset prices.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes the previous 
literature on investor attention. Section 1.3 describes data sources and sample construction. 
Section 1.4 investigates the seasonal patterns of attention, and Section 1.5 examines attention and 
information shocks. Section 1.6 concludes the paper.  
1.2 Literature review 
A large body of economics and finance literature has studied investors’ limited attention. In the 
cross-section, Peng (2005) studies investors’ endogenous attention allocation and predicts that 
larger stocks, which tend to contribute more to the total fundamental uncertainty of an investor’s 
portfolio, are likely to receive more attention from investors. Higher investor attention to large 
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stocks then translates to a faster price adjustment to information shocks and higher price 
informativeness. This chapter empirically tests these predictions.  
Peng and Xiong (2006) model the investors’ strategy in allocating their limited attention and 
study its effect on asset-price dynamics. They show that limited investor attention leads to 
category-learning behavior, i.e. investors tend to process more market and sector-wide information 
than firm-specific information. The intuition is that given limited time and cognitive resources, 
processing more market-wide or sector-wide information than firm-specific information is more 
efficient in reducing portfolio uncertainty. Combined with investor overconfidence, limited 
investor attention generates excess comovement and low price informativeness.  
Previous literature has also studied the impact of investors’ limited attention on asset prices and 
investors’ trading behavior. Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors are net buyers 
of attention- grabbing stocks. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) also provide strong support for this 
argument. They use search volume index (SVI) from Google Trends to proxy for investor attention 
and find that an increase in SVI predicts higher stock prices in the following two weeks and an 
eventual price reversal within the year.   
Papers have shown that limited attention helps to explain investors’ underreaction to news. 
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) both find that lower investor 
attention is associated with lower immediate reactions and higher delayed reactions to firms’ 
earnings announcements. Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) use Friday as an exogenous variation in 
investor attention. The assumption is that investors are likely to be distracted by the upcoming 
weekend and pay less attention to investment-related information. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 
(2009) support this finding using the same-day number of earnings announcements as a proxy for 
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investor attention. They assume that investors pay less attention to each piece of information as 
the total number of earnings announcements increases.  
Papers have shown that limited attention helps to explain underreaction in other settings as well. 
Using abnormal trading volume as a proxy for investor attention, Loh (2010) confirms that low-
attention stocks react less to stock recommendations than high-attention stocks using three-day 
event windows. Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2012) examine this question from the opposite 
perspective. They find that abnormal attention before the release of earnings announcements is 
negatively associated with immediate price reactions, suggesting that investor attention before the 
earnings announcements preempts its information content.  
Previous papers have used indirect measures of attention such as abnormal trading volume 
(Barber and Odean (2008), Hou, Peng, and Xiong (2008), Loh (2010)), abnormal return (Barber 
and Odean (2008)), and media news (Barber and Odean (2008)). The assumption is that a stock’s 
abnormal return, trading volume, and media news closely relate to investor attention. However, a 
stock’s return or trading volume can be driven by other factors, and media mention does not 
guarantee investor attention. Huberman and Regev (2001) show a vivid example where previous 
media coverage by Nature, a science journal, and the New York Times failed to attract sufficient 
investor attention to the breakthrough discovery of a cancer drug by Entremed. Only after a front 
page article on the same news, months later, did the stock price surge.  Furthermore, using Google 
search-based attention measures, Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) show that the relationship 
between attention and abnormal return or abnormal volume is quite low and that there is little 




1.3 Data and variable descriptions 
My sample consists of stocks that are included in the S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 indices 
between January 2004 and December 2013. I choose these S&P 1500 stocks to make data 
collection and cleaning manageable while maintaining a reasonable degree of cross-sectional 
variation in the type of stocks. I start with all of the 2,251 stocks ever included in the S&P 1500 
index during the sample period to ensure that my results are free of survivorship bias and index 
changes.  
Data used in this chapter comes from five sources. I obtain the measure for investor attention 
from Google Trends, whose coverage begins in January 2004, macro news announcements from 
Bloomberg, firms’ quarterly earnings announcements from I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT, firm 
fundamental information from COMPUSTAT, and stock-related information from CRSP. I 
include only common stock and require that a firm be included in the COMPUSTAT-CRSP 
merged database.  
My main variable of interest, abnormal investor attention (AbnAttention), is constructed using 
search frequency data from Google (Search Volume Index (SVI)). Following Da, Engelberg, and 
Gao (2011), I download the daily Search Volume Index (SVI) for a firm’s ticker symbol to 
construct a measure of investor attention.  
Google Trends provides information on how often a particular search term is entered in Google 
Search by reporting the search volume index (SVI), defined as a term’s search frequency on a day 
relative to the highest frequency over a specified period. As argued by Da et al. (2011), search 
frequency in Google is a direct and unambiguous measure of investor attention for the following 
two reasons. First, Google dominates the web search market, and its reported search volume is 
likely to be representative of the internet search behavior of the general population. Second, and 
7 
 
more importantly, searching for a stock via Google is a direct indication that active attention has 
been devoted to the stock. Similar arguments are also made by Choi and Varian (2009) who find 
that search data can predict home sales, automotive sales, and tourism, and Ginsberg et al. (2009) 
who find that search data can predict flu outbreaks.  
I define AbnAttention as the difference between a ticker’s daily SVI and its average SVI from 




                                                   (1) 
The past year average captures the baseline level of attention that is free of any monthly and 
weekday seasonalities. Thus, AbnAttention captures the deviation of attention from the normal 
level, as a percentage, and any potential time trends. For example, an AbnAttention value of 30% 
indicates that the search interest on a particular day is 30% higher than its past one year average. I 
exclude the most recent month in computing the average to avoid potential spillover effects in 
attention.  
I require that at least 60 days of SVI data be available during the sample period for a firm to be 
included in the analysis. 1 I also manually screen all of the tickers to select those that do not have 
a generic meaning (e.g., “GPS” for GAP Inc., “M” for Macy’s) to ensure that the search results I 
obtain are really about the stock, not other generic items or products of the firm.2 These restrictions 
result in a final sample of 1,316 firms and 2,818,625 firm-day observations.  
                                                     
1 691 firms are dropped in this stage. 
2 145 firms are dropped in this process. 
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Table 1.1 shows the composition of my final sample. Out of the 2,250 firms I start with, about 
59% remains: 73% of the S&P 500 firms, 63% of the S&P 400 firms, and 45% of the S&P 600 
firms. This is because Google Trends does not return a valid SVI if a ticker is rarely searched, and 
this truncation is more likely to occur for small stocks.  
For illustrative purposes, I plot AbnAttention for American International Group Inc. (AIG) in 
Figure 1.1 and Apple Inc. (AAPL) in Figure 1.2.  Figure 1.1 shows that AbnAttention to AIG was 
the highest during the most recent financial crisis. It spiked on September 16, 2008 (about 3100% 
higher than the normal level) when the Federal Reserve Board authorized the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York to lend up to $85 billion to the American International Group. The high 
attention level persisted for a few days and jumped again on October 8, 2008 when the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York announced that it would lend another $37.8 billion to AIG.  In Figure 
1.2, I observe that the highest attention to AAPL occurred on October 6, 2011, one day after Steve 
Jobs, the founder of Apple, passed away at 3 pm. High attention for Apple Inc. also occurs on new 
product release days and earnings announcement days. This is consistent with the fact that 
investors actively analyze the impact of news on firms’ prospects via Google searches. These 
examples suggest that the AbnAttention measure captures changes in investor attention and 
response to important news events.  
To test investors’ attention response to firm-specific news, I focus on firms’ quarterly earnings 
announcements. All publicly traded U.S. firms need to make earnings announcements regularly, 
and it is one of the most important sources of information for investors. I extract information about 
firms’ earnings announcements from I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT. For my sample, there are 30,595 
quarterly earnings announcements, of which 27,337 are covered by the I/B/E/S database. 
Following Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), I adopt the earlier date when there is a discrepancy 
9 
 
between the announcement dates recorded in I/B/E/S and COMPUSTAT. Because investors are 
more likely to pay attention to a firm during trading hours, I identify investor attention to an 
earnings announcement as the attention on the first trading day after the news announcement. 
Therefore, if an announcement is made before or during trading hours, I match it with 
AbnAttention measured on the same day. If the news is announced after trading hours or during a 
holiday, I match it with AbnAttention for the next trading day.   
I measure the magnitude of earnings surprises using standardized unexpected earnings (SUE). It 
is defined as the difference between the actual earnings and the median analyst forecasts over the 
90-day period before the actual announcement, scaled by stock price as of the fiscal quarter end 
date. If an analyst makes multiple forecasts during the period, I use only the most recent one. I 
delete observations when actual EPS or forecasts are higher than the stock price, or when the stock 
price is below $5.   
SUE=
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑃𝑆−𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑃𝑆
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑛𝑑 
 
To study the effect of market-wide shocks on investor attention, I obtain information for twenty-
nine important macro news releases from Bloomberg. Examples of these releases include GDP, 
non-farm payroll, and CPI, with the full list shown in Appendix 1.2. I report the number of 
observations, start and end date in my sample, release date and time, and the relevance value for 
each news type. Relevance value (ranging between 0 and 100) is a measure of the importance of 
macro news assigned by Bloomberg. It is constructed based on the number of subscriptions by 
investors. GDP data and employment statistics are among the most important news for investors, 
according to the relevance value. Out of the 3,286 calendar days in my sample period, 1,654 days 
have at least one macro news announcement. Since almost all macro news are announced before 
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or during trading hours, I match AbnAttention with the same day of the macro news 
announcements.   
To test if investor attention has an impact on trading activities, I construct an abnormal trading 
volume (AbnTurnover) measure, which is defined as the difference between turnover on a 
particular day and the average daily turnover for the past year, skipping the most recent month: 
AbnTurnover = Turnovert − Average turnover(t−21,t−252)  
1.4 Descriptive analysis of investor attention 
Summary statistics of the abnormal attention measure are shown in Table 1.2. The mean and 
median for AbnAttention are both close to zero, suggesting that the attention a firm receives on a 
typical day is close to its past one-year average. Though, the standard deviation is 28.754%, 
suggesting that there is considerable cross-sectional and time-series variation in attention. 
1.4.1 Day of week pattern 
Motivated by Dellavigna and Pollet (2009), who posit that investor attention is low on Fridays, I 
study the patterns of investors’ attention across different weekdays. I compute and plot the mean 
and median of AbnAttention for different weekdays and test whether they are statistically different 
using both a difference of means test and a non-parametric median test.  
Table 1.3 summarizes the day-of-week patterns of abnormal attention. Panel A presents the mean 
and median AbnAttention and the total number of earnings announcements for all firm-day 
observations. Panel B presents the mean and median AbnAttention for firm-days with earnings 
announcements. Panel C compares the mean and median AbnAttention on days with versus 
without earnings announcements for the same day of the week. Standard errors for the means test 
are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. 
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Panel A shows that the means of AbnAttention on Monday through Thursday are 3.85%, 4.65%, 
4.33%, and 3.80%, respectively, with the average of the weekday means being 4.16%. In contrast, 
AbnAttention for Friday is only 1.57% and is significantly lower than the average attention for the 
other four weekdays. Weekend days have an even lower level of abnormal attention, -7.4% for 
Sundays and -7.9% for Saturdays, suggesting that investors’ attention to stocks is mostly during 
trading days. The day of the week attention pattern is also illustrated in Figure 1.3, which shows 
consistent patterns.  
One may argue that the lower number of Google searches for a stock on Fridays does not 
necessarily mean that investors are paying less attention to the stock. It could be that there are not 
as many Friday news releases. To control for the amount of information, I count the number of 
earnings announcements on each weekday. Figure 1.3 and Panel A in Table 1.3 indeed show that 
the number of earnings announcements is considerably lower on Fridays (2,126 announcements) 
than on the other four weekdays (an average of 7,117). 
To examine the amount of investor attention associated with each earnings announcement, I focus 
on a subsample of firm-day observations with earnings announcements. Panel B shows that while 
the earnings announcements released on Mondays through Thursdays are associated with a mean 
(median) AbnAttention of 9.14% (4.53%), Friday announcements are associated with a mean 
(median) AbnAttention of 5.41% (1.73%). The difference in means is -3.73% and in medians is -
2.80%, both significant at the 1% level.  The result confirms that Friday earning announcements 
do indeed attract less investor attention. The pattern is also demonstrated in Figure 1.4.  
One may also argue that the baseline levels of attention, when there is no earnings announcement, 
on Fridays could simply be low. To address this concern, I then compare AbnAttention associated 
with earnings announcements from Panel B with the average attention for the same weekday 
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without earnings announcements. Panel C presents the results. It shows that, for Mondays through 
Thursdays, earnings announcements generate 5.78% higher levels of attention than the baseline 
level for those weekdays. Friday announcements only generate 4.28% higher levels of attention 
than the baseline level. The difference is 1.03% and statistically significant.  
Thus, even after controlling for the number of earnings announcements, and after controlling for 
the low level of baseline attention on Fridays, I find that the amount of attention paid to Friday 
earnings announcements is significantly lower than the attention paid to other weekday 
announcements. The findings suggest that investors are less attentive to news released on Fridays. 
My result substantiates the assumptions made in Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) that investor 
attention is lower on Fridays and supports the story that Friday earnings announcements generate 
weaker immediate reactions and that greater post earnings announcement drifts are due to investor 
inattention. 
1.4.2 Month of year pattern 
Next, I examine the seasonality of investor attention across different months of the year. Hong 
and Yu (2009) hypothesize that investors tend to have “gone fishin” during the summer months 
and are less attentive to the stock market, and find that summer month trading volumes are 
significantly lower than other months.  
In Panel A of Table 1.4, I present the mean and median abnormal attention for different months 
of the year. The table shows that abnormal attention to stocks is considerably low in the summer 
months of July and August, with average levels of -0.49% and 0.06%, respectively. The average 
level of abnormal attention for the summer months is significantly lower than the average level of 
abnormal attention for the other months, with a difference of 0.76%. This fact is surprising, 
13 
 
especially for the month of July, given the fact it contains a large number of earnings 
announcements, at 4,217, second only to October. Thus, it is unlikely that the lower amount of 
attention in July is because news is scant.   
It is also worth noting that the abnormal attention level is also very low for the month of 
December. However, since there are only 518 earnings announcements in December, it may not 
necessarily be the case that December announcements attract less investor attention.  
To account for the possibility that the amount of news supplied to the market may differ from 
month to month, I examine abnormal attention associated with earnings announcements by 
focusing on the subsample of firm-days with earnings announcements. The results are presented 
in Panel B of Table 1.4. AbnAttention associated with earnings announcements is lowest for the 
months of July and August. The average difference in AbnAttention between these two summer 
months and the rest of the year is 1.82% and is statistically significant. On the other hand, 
AbnAttention for December earnings announcements is similar to those in May, June, and 
November.  
In Panel C, I compare AbnAttention associated with earning announcements with the baseline 
level of attention for the same month, excluding earnings announcement days. The difference gives 
a clean measure of the effect of earnings announcements on investor attention while controlling 
for potential differences in the baseline level across months. The results show that the average 
increase in AbnAttention for earnings announced during July and August are 8.34% and 8.94%, 
respectively. The average AbnAttention difference for these two months is 1.03% lower than the 
average difference across all other months and is statistically significant. However, there are other 
months in which earnings announcements generate an even smaller increase in AbnAttention, such 
as, May, February, and August. More surprisingly, given that the baseline level of attention in 
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December is so low (at -4.27%), earnings announced during this month generate an AbnAttention 
difference of 13.1%, the highest among all of the months. The result is also illustrated in Figures 
1.5 and 1.6. 
My results thus confirm the “gone fishin” conjecture made in Hong and Yu (2009) that investors 
are less attentive to the stock market during the summer. However, my results using a direct 
measure of investor attention, show that the attention associated with each piece of news may not 
necessarily be small during these months.  
1.4.3 The dynamic relation between attention, trading volume, returns, and 
volatility 
In this section, I describe the dynamic properties of daily investor attention, as well as the effect 
of attention on financial markets in terms of trading volume (AbnTurnover), return, and volatility 
(Absolute return) using a vector autoregression system (VAR). I choose to include four lags for 
the VAR system as suggested by optimal lag selection criterion. Following a methodology that is 
similar to Da et al. (2011), I first perform VAR analysis for each stock and then average the 
coefficients across stocks to form the mean estimates. Standard errors are obtained using block-
bootstrap at the stock level, with replacement of 5000 times. P-values are calculated assuming a 
normal distribution. 
Results of the VAR are presented in Table 1.5, with Panel A showing raw returns and Panel B 
showing abnormal returns. I find that AbnAttention is quite persistent, with all four lags significant. 
AbnAttention also significantly increases trading volume and price volatility on the following day.  
On the other hand, past return significantly increases AbnAttention. Return is also negatively 
serially correlated, consistent with the short-term reversal of returns due to microstructure effects. 
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Trading volume and volatility are also quite persistent themselves, but they do not significantly 
affect AbnAttention.  
These results suggest that investor attention has important implications on asset prices, trading, 
and volatility. Therefore, it is important to understand the determinants of attention and how 
investors make decisions in attention allocation and information processing.   
1.5 Attention and information shocks 
 In this section, I investigate how investors allocate attention in response to information 
shocks. I employ two forms of information shocks, firm-specific information shocks in the form 
of earnings announcements, and systematic information shocks in the form of macroeconomic 
news releases. I first analyze investors’ attention responses to each type of shock separately, and 
then study investors’ attention allocation decisions when these two types of shocks occur at the 
same time.  
1.5.1 Attention response to firm-specific news 
In this section, I focus on firm-level information shocks in the form of earnings announcements. 
I analyze investors’ attention response to earnings announcements by comparing investors’ 
attention on firm days with earnings announcements and firm days without earnings 
announcements. The results in Panel A of Table 1.6 show that AbnAttention is 9.28% on days with 
earnings announcements and 3.56% on other days, yielding a statistically significant difference of 
5.72%.  
The results suggest that investors actively pay attention to information revealed through earnings 
announcements. This is also consistent with predictions of the rational inattention models (Sims, 
2003, and Peng, 2005) that investors actively increase their attention when there are information 
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shocks that increase the uncertainty of the asset. In a frictionless world, when information can be 
processed immediately with infinite precision, earnings announcements reduce uncertainty. 
However, when investors have limited attention, it takes them time to process information. Thus, 
information shocks lead to an increase in uncertainty, and only after devoting attention to process 
information can uncertainty be reduced. The results are consistent with Barber and Odean (2008) 
who argue that investor attention increases in response to salient news and headlines. 
I next investigate how attention’s reaction to earnings announcements may differ in the cross 
section. Peng (2005) models the attention allocation of an investor whose portfolio consists of 
multiple stocks and shows that attention constrained investors would optimally allocate more 
attention to larger stocks in their portfolio, as these stocks contribute a greater amount to their total 
portfolio uncertainty and thus processing information about these firms would have the greatest 
benefit. It is also possible that large firms receive more coverage from news media outlets, such 
that large firms’ announcements attract a greater amount of attention from investors as their news 
are more salient, consistent with Barber and Odean (2008). 
I sort firms into five quintiles by their market capitalization as of June based on NYSE size 
breakpoints. I then compare the attention response to earnings announcements across different size 
groups and report the result in Panel B of Table 1.5. It shows that, while the increase in attention 
is significant for all size groups, large firms’ earnings announcements receive a significantly 
greater amount of attention, an increase of 15.4% for the largest firms on earnings announcement 
days, when compared to no announcement days. In contrast, small firms’ attention only increases 
by 1.32% on earnings announcement days. The difference is 14.1% and highly significant.  
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Thus, the result suggests that earnings announcements are associated with greater investor 
attention, and the increase in attention is highest for the largest firms. The result is consistent with 
the rational attention allocation hypothesis as well as the salient news hypothesis. 
As a robustness check (reported in Appendix 1.3), I exclude both weekends and firm days with 
macro news announcements to address the concern that other sources of information may 
contaminate the result. The results are even stronger. The average AbnAttention is 7.52% higher 
on earnings announcement days. The increase of attention associated with earnings 
announcements is 15.5% higher for firms in the top quintile than those in the bottom quintile.  
1.5.2 Attention response to systematic news 
In this section, I analyze investors’ attention response to systematic information shocks in the 
form of 29 macroeconomic announcements. In Panel A of Table 1.6, I compare investor attention 
on macro news announcement days with attention on non-macro news announcement days. The 
mean of AbnAttention is 3.86% on the macro-announcement days and 3.12% on the non-macro-
announcement days. The difference is 0.74% and highly significant. The result indicates that 
macro announcements lead to more information processing for individual stocks, as investors are 
eager to figure out the impact of macro shocks on individual companies. 
Another interesting pattern to observe is that, although attention responds significantly to both 
earnings announcements and macroeconomic announcements, the magnitude is very different. The 
average earnings announcement generates an increase in AbnAttention of 5.72% while the average 
macroeconomic announcement only increases AbnAttention by 0.74%.    
In Panel B of Table 1.6, I compare the attention response to macro news announcements for firms 
of different sizes by examining AbnAttention for firms sorted into size quintiles. The attention 
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response increases with size: 0.436% for the smallest firms and 1.48% for the largest firms. The 
difference is 1.04% and is significant at the 1% level. These results show that investors pay close 
attention to the macro-level news, and large firms are the ones that they particularly focus on. 
Presumably, analyzing the reaction of large cap stocks and sector leaders are investors’ ways of 
digesting the effect of macro news on the economy. 
To address the concern that other sources of information may contaminate the result, I exclude 
firm-days with earnings announcements and report the results in Appendix 1.4. The results are 
very similar. 
Overall, the results on attention response to macroeconomic announcements suggest that 
investors increase their attention to stocks in a way that is consistent with both the rational attention 
allocation hypothesis as well as the salient event attention hypothesis. 
1.5.3 Attention allocation across different types of information 
In this section, I analyze how investors allocate their limited attention across different types of 
news. Peng and Xiong (2006) model investor attention allocation decisions when faced with firm-
specific news, market-wide news and sector-wide news. The model predicts that, upon market-
wide information shocks, attention constrained investors will shift attention away from processing 
firm-specific information and allocate more attention to the market-wide news, as this allocation 
reduces their portfolio uncertainty more effectively.  
I test this hypothesis by comparing attention for firms’ earnings announcements on macro news 
announcement days and non-macro news announcement days. The prediction is that the attention 
response for an individual firm’s earnings announcement should be lower if the important macro 
news is announced on the same day.   
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The results are shown in Panel A of Table 1.7. AbnAttention for earnings announcements is 
10.56% on days without macro news, but it reduces to 8.97% on macro news days. The difference 
is -1.59% and statistically significant. The finding suggests that there is indeed a limit to investor 
attention and that investors have to shift attention away from processing firm-specific information 
on days with large macroeconomic information shocks, consistent with Peng and Xiong (2006). 
In Panel B of Table 1.7, I sort firms into five portfolios based on market capitalization and 
investigate the cross-sectional variations. The results show that the attenuation effect is 
concentrated in medium-sized firms, and the effect is weak for very large firms and very small 
firms: the difference between AbnAttention for earnings announced on macro news days versus 
non-macro news days are 0.45%, 3.67%, 1.58%, 1.93% and 1.32% for firms belonging to size 
quintiles 1 through 5, respectively. 
One explanation is that investors process macroeconomic news announcements through 
analyzing their impact on large firms that are market or sector leaders, and this increased attention 
offsets the effect of attention shifts. Very small firms, on the other hand, do not attract much 
investor attention even on the days without macroeconomic news. Thus macro news does not have 
much impact on the attention to these firms.  
Not all macroeconomic releases are equally important, and they will have different impacts on 
investors’ attention allocation decisions. I select five of the most important macro news based on 
the criteria that the Bloomberg relevance score needs to be higher than 95. These macroeconomic 




I compare investor attention associated with earnings announcements on firm-days with 
important macro news and firm-days with no macro news. The results are presented in Table 1.9. 
The results show that AbnAttention for earnings announcements is 10.56% on days without macro 
news, but it reduces to 8.12% on the five most important macro news days, a further reduction 
from the 8.97% presented in Table 1.8 for all macro news events. 
Regarding cross-sectional patterns, AbnAttention to earnings announcements is lower on days 
with these five important macro news announcements for all of the firms and the difference is 
significant for all except the smallest ones. This suggests that important macroeconomic news 
shifts investor attention away from analyzing firm-specific shocks for most of the firms in the 
market. 
1.5.4 Multivariate Tests 
To jointly control for other possible determinants of investor attention, I perform multivariate 
panel regressions. The dependent variable is LogAttention, defined as ln(AbnAttention+1). I make 
the log transformation so that the distribution of the dependent variable is closer to a normal 
distribution.  
To control for other possible determinants of investor attention, I run regressions of 
AbnAttention1 on an earnings announcement day dummy, macro news announcement dummy, an 





macro + Controli,t +𝜖𝑖,𝑡   (1) 
Where Ii,t
earnings is a dummy variable that equals to one when there is an earnings announcement 
for firm i on day t and zero otherwise. Ii,t
macro is a dummy that equals to one when there is macro 
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news announcement on day t and zero otherwise. The control variables I include in the regression 
are the logarithm of firm size, book to market, day of week fixed effect, and month of year fixed 
effect. 
The analysis in the previous section suggests that investor attention increases in response to 
earnings announcements and macro news announcements. It also shows that macro news 
announcements attenuate the attention response for earnings announcements. Thus, I expect α1 
and α2 to be positive and α3 to be negative.  
The regression results are reported in Table 1.8. As shown in Column 1, the coefficient on the 
earnings announcement dummy is 0.126 and significant at 1% level. This suggests that attention 
is significantly higher on the day of earnings announcements. In Column 2, I regress LogAttentioni 
on the macro news day dummy. The coefficient on the macro news announcement day dummy is 
0.119 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that investor attention is significantly higher on 
macro news announcement days. In Column 3, I regress LogAttentioni on the earnings 
announcement dummy, the macro news announcement dummy, and the interaction of the two. 
Consistent with my expectation, the coefficient on the interaction term is -0.142 and significant at 
the 1% level, implying that upon receiving macro shocks, investors shift their attention away from 
analyzing firm-specific information. In Column 4 and Column 5, I add additional control variables 
such as day of week and month fixed effects, as well as firm size and book-to-market ratio, and 
the results are very similar. Size, book-to-market ratio, and the size dummy variable are 
insignificant. This is as expected because the dependent variable LogAttention is demeaned and 
only captures changes in investor attention, thus does not vary with fixed firm characteristics. 
In Columns 6 and 7, I allow for the interaction of information dummies with firm size to examine 
the potential cross-sectional variations of attention determinants. Ilarge equals one if firm size is in 
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the top size quintile and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction term between the 
earnings announcement dummy and the large firm dummy is positive (0.132 without controls, 
0.133 with controls) and significant at the 1% level. Similarly, the coefficient on the interaction 
term between the macro news announcement dummy and the large firm dummy is also positive 
and significant at 1% level. This suggests that the attention response to earnings and macro news 
announcements are more pronounced for large firms. 
Overall, these results are consistent with the one-dimensional sorting results I established earlier. 
They show that investors increase the amount of attention they pay to stocks in response to earnings 
announcements and macroeconomic releases and that there is a substitution effect in that macro 
announcements shift investor attention away from processing firm-specific information shocks.  
I next focus my analysis on investors’ attention response to earnings announcements by 
examining a subsample including only firm-day observations with an earnings announcement. In 
doing so, I can control for more variables that are associated with each announcement and 
investigate how the degree of attention response to earnings announcements depends on other 
confounding information events, the nature of earnings surprises, and firm characteristics.  
I regress LogAttention on the macro news announcement dummy, absolute earnings surprise, 
natural logarithm of the number of analysts following plus one, natural logarithm of the number 
of same-day earnings announcements, firm size or large firm dummy, and book to market. Day of 
week and month fixed effects are included, and p-values for regression coefficients are constructed 
with robust standard errors, double clustered by firm and day.   
The regression results are reported in Table 1.11. In Column (1), the coefficient on the natural 
logarithm of size is 0.0365 and significant at the1% level, suggesting that investor attention 
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responds more to large firms’ earnings announcements. The coefficient on absolute earnings 
surprise is 0.471 and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that large earnings surprises tend to 
generate a higher attention response. I find the number of same-day earnings announcements to be 
negatively related to the attention an earnings announcement receives (the coefficient for the 
number of earnings announcements is -0.0134 and significant at 1% level). This is consistent with 
Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2013), who argue that confounding earnings announcements distract 
investors and lowers the attention allocated to each announcement. The coefficient on book-to-
market is negative but not significant.   
In Column (2), I include the macro news dummy. The coefficient on the macro news 
announcement day dummy is -0.0223 and significant at 5% level. This is consistent with the 
finding in Table 1.7 that an earnings announcement generates less investor attention when it is 
announced on the same day as macro news. In Column (3), I interact the macro news day dummy 
with the large firm dummy. The coefficient is 0.013 but insignificant, suggesting that there is no 
significant difference in the attenuation effect between large firms and small firms. 
1.5.5 Attention allocation and trading volume 
In this section, I test the implications of endogenous attention allocation on trading volume. If 
macro news distracts investors’ attention to a firm’s earnings announcements, I should expect a 
lower trading volume response on macro news days. I test this hypothesis by comparing trading 
volume on earnings announcement days with and without macro news announcements.  
The results are shown in Table 1.12. I find that the abnormal daily turnover ratio is 0.0203 for 
earnings announcement days without macro news, but it falls by about 10% to 0.0181 for 
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announcement days with the macro news. The difference is 0.0022 and is significant at the 1% 
level.  
To further control for the magnitude of earning surprises, I sort firm-day observations into deciles 
according to the magnitude of the earnings surprise, and then compare abnormal trading volume 
for macro news days and non-macro news days within each surprise decile. The results show that 
for all deciles, the volume responses to earnings announcements are smaller when there is 
confounding macro news. The differences are significant for five out of the ten groups: the most 
negative earnings surprise group and all of the positive earnings surprise groups.  
As shown in the VAR analysis in Table 1.5, investor attention is an important factor that drives 
volume changes. The volume evidence from Table 1.12 thus supports the attention allocation 
results in Table 1.8, suggesting that investors rationally allocate their limited attention across 
various sources of information, process the information, and conduct trading accordingly.  
1.6 Conclusion 
This chapter studies investor attention and its determinants. I find that investor attention shows a 
strong seasonality pattern; it is lower on Fridays and during summer months. Investor attention 
rises when there is firm-specific or macro level news, suggesting that investors react to information 
shocks by increasing their attention and actively processing information to update their beliefs 
about firm prospects. The effect is stronger for large firms. I also document evidence that investors 
strategically allocate their limited attention. When market-wide information shocks and firm-
specific information shocks occur simultaneously, investors shift their attention away from firm-
specific information. Furthermore, multiple earnings announcements on the same day distract 
investors and result in lower attention to each announcement. Lastly, trading volume on earnings 
announcement days is significantly lower when there is a concurrent macro news release. These 
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results confirm the predictions of investor attention models and the implicit assumptions made by 
previous empirical work on investor attention. It suggests that investors actively manage the level 
of attention that they pay to the stock market, allocate their attention strategically to process 
information, and trade accordingly. It would be interesting to extend the analysis in the future to 

















Figure 1.1 AbnAttention to American International Group Inc.(AIG) 
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Figure 1.3 Attention patterns: day-of-week effect 
AbnAttention on each day of week is calculated as the mean (median) AbnAttention of all 
firm-days on that day of week. The precise numbers in this figure are presented in Table 1.3. In 
testing the difference in mean, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Difference in mean test  Difference in median test 
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Figure 1.4 Attention response to earnings announcements: day-of-week effect 
In this figure, I present mean (median) AbnAttention on firm-days with an earnings 
announcement by day of week. For each earnings announcement, I record the AbnAttention on 
the first trading day after the announcement. The precise numbers in this figure are presented in 
Table 1.3. In testing the difference in mean, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Difference in mean test  Difference in median test 
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Figure 1.5 Attention patterns: month-of-year effect 
AbnAttention in each month of year is calculated as the mean (median) AbnAttention of all 
firm-days in that month of year. The precise numbers in this figure are presented in Table 1.4. In 
testing the difference in mean, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Difference in mean test  Difference in median test 
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Figure 1.6 Attention response to earnings announcements:  month of the year effect 
In this figure, I present mean (median) AbnAttention on firm-days with earnings 
announcements by month of year.  For each earnings announcement, I record the AbnAttention 
on the first trading day after the announcement. The precise numbers in this figure are presented 
in Table 1.4. In testing the difference in mean, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Difference in mean test  Difference in median test 
















Table 1.1 Sample description 
This table presents the number of firms that are included in the S&P 500, S&P 400, and S&P 600 for the period of 
2004-2013, and the number of firms that remain in my final sample. 
 S&P 500 firms S&P400 firms S&P600 firms Total 
Total number of S&P from 2004-2013 707 590 953 2250 
Number of firms in my sample 516 369 431 1316 
Number of firms relative to S&P 73% 63% 45% 58.5% 
 
Table 1.2 Summary statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for AbnAttention. The sample consists of 2,818,625 firm-day 
observations for 1,316 firms. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 1.1. AbnAttention is winsorized at 
the 0.1% and 99.9% level. 
 Variable Count Mean SD P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 












Table 1.3 Abnormal attention patterns: day-of-week 
This table summarizes the day-of-week patterns of abnormal attention, AbnAttention. Panel A presents the mean and median AbnAttention and the total 
number of earnings announcements. Panel B presents the mean and median AbnAttention for firm-weekdays with earnings announcements. Panel C compares 
the mean and median AbnAttention on days with and without earnings announcements for the same day of week. In testing the differences in means, standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Average AbnAttention 









Mean(AbnAttention) -7.40% 3.85% 4.65% 4.33% 3.80% 1.57% -7.94% 4.16% -2.59%*** 
Median(AbnAttention) -8.67% 2.19% 2.95% 2.51% 1.99% -0.26% -9.48% 2.41% 
 
Number of earnings 
announcements 
18 3272 7222 7803 10172 2126 5 
    
            
Panel B: AbnAttention to earnings announcements  






Mean(AbnAttention) 10.74% 11.06% 9.49% 8.10% 5.83% 9.53%  -3.70%*** 
Median(AbnAttention) 5.73% 6.07% 4.25% 3.24% 1.97% 4.47%       
            
Panel C: AbnAttention on days with versus without earnings announcements  
Earnings announcement 
day 




YES 10.74% 11.06% 9.49% 8.10% 5.83%     
NO 3.80% 4.55% 4.24% 3.69% 1.55%     







Table 1.4 Abnormal attention patterns: month of year effect 
In Panel A, I present AbnAttention and the total number of earnings announcements by month of year. AbnAttention in each month of year is the mean 
(median) of all firm-days in that month of year. In Panel B, I present mean (median) AbnAttention on firm-days with earnings announcements by month of 
year. In Panel C, I compare AbnAttention on days with and without earnings by month of year. In testing the differences in means, standard errors are adjusted 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: AbnAttention by month of year 






0.27% 1.63% 1.23% 1.00% 1.62% 0.33% -0.49% 0.06% 1.11% 1.80% 0.86% -4.25% -0.757%*** 
Median(AbnAtte
ntion) 




2551 3939 1025 4122 3074 541 4271 2925 471 4495 2801 518   
              
Panel B: AbnAttention to earnings announcements by month of year 






11.44% 9.32% 11.22% 9.63% 8.47% 8.64% 8.30% 7.15% 11.65% 9.91% 8.84% 8.85% -1.82%*** 
Median(AbnAtte
ntion) 
5.03% 5.27% 6.49% 4.35% 4.15% 3.20% 2.98% 2.75% 6.13% 4.28% 4.25% 3.14%   
              








YES 11.44% 9.32% 11.22% 9.63% 8.47% 8.64% 8.30% 7.15% 11.65% 9.91% 8.84% 8.85%  

































Table 1.5 Vector Autoregression (VAR) model of attention, turnover, return, and absolute return 
In this table, I run vector autoregression models of AbnAttention, abnormal turnover, return, and absolute return. The variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. I 
first run VAR for each stock, and then the coefficients are averaged across stocks. The standard errors of coefficients are calculated using block bootstrap at 
the stock level replaced 5000 times, and the p-value is then calculated under the normal distribution assumption. In Panel A, I run the model with raw return 
and absolute raw return. In Panel B, I run the model with abnormal return and absolute abnormal return.  
Panel A: AbnAttention, AbnTurnover, raw return, and absolute raw return  Panel B: AbnAttention, AbnTurnover, abnormal return, and absolute abnormal return 











Lag 1 0.363*** 0.0004*** -0.00005 0.0006***  
AbnAttention 
Lag 1 0.3627*** 0.0004*** 0.0001 0.0007*** 
Lag 2 0.0793*** -0.0001 -0.0005*** 0.0001  Lag 2 0.0795*** -0.0001 0.0001 -0.00001 
Lag 3 0.0535*** -0.00003 -0.00003 0.00003  Lag 3 0.0536*** -0.00002 -0.0001 0.0001 
Lag 4 0.1053*** 0.00003 0.0002 0.0003  Lag 4 0.105*** 0.00003 0 0.0001 
AbnTurnover 
Lag 1 -0.5775 0.3606*** 0.0348*** 0.1066***  
AbnTurnover 
Lag 1 -0.6845 0.3643*** 0.0331*** 0.1282*** 
Lag 2 -0.0627 0.0947*** -0.001 -0.0517***  Lag 2 -0.2202 0.098*** 0.0092 -0.0199* 
Lag 3 0.6459 0.0707*** -0.025*** -0.0831***  Lag 3 0.7952 0.0739*** 0.005 -0.0588*** 
Lag 4 0.2495 0.0737*** -0.0193*** -0.004  Lag 4 0.4685* 0.0747*** -0.0121*** -0.0195*** 
Raw return 
Lag 1 0.1292 -0.0089*** -0.0474*** -0.0404***  
Abnormal 
return 
Lag 1 0.1373 -0.0029*** -0.0214*** -0.0064*** 
Lag 2 0.2811*** -0.0043*** -0.0274*** -0.0351***  Lag 2 0.0184 -0.0022*** -0.0156*** -0.0077*** 
Lag 3 -0.0659 -0.0035*** -0.0197*** -0.0284***  Lag 3 -0.0165 -0.002*** -0.0164*** -0.0113*** 
Lag 4 0.0871 -0.003*** -0.0236*** -0.0241***  Lag 4 0.1317 -0.0012 -0.0138*** -0.0099*** 
Absolute raw 
return 
Lag 1 -0.0034 0.0148*** 0.0183*** 0.1138***  
Absolute 
abnormal return 
Lag 1 0.0814 0.0158*** 0.0006 0.1076*** 
Lag 2 -0.4331 -0.0072*** 0.0122*** 0.1209***  Lag 2 -0.2398 -0.0125*** 0.0047* 0.0809*** 
Lag 3 -0.249 -0.0079*** 0.0315*** 0.111***  Lag 3 -0.4093* -0.0106*** 0.0085*** 0.0783*** 






Table 1.6 Attention responses to earnings announcements 
In this table, I compare investors' AbnAttention on firm-days with and without earnings announcements. 
Weekends are excluded. In Panel A, I report the result for the full sample. In Panel B, I sort firms into five size 
groups in each June based on NYSE breakpoints. Standard errors are in parentheses. In testing the differences in 
means, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Earnings 
announcement day Count Mean SD P25 Median P75 
YES 30595 9.28% 34.78% -7.78% 4.28% 18.21% 
NO 1982265 3.56% 27.07% -10.25% 1.81% 14.67% 
DIF(YES-NO)  5.72%***     
       
Panel B: By size 
 Size group: NYSE breakpoints  
Earnings 
announcement day 1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5(Largest) DIF(5-1) 
YES 4.405% 5.807% 4.969% 7.677% 19.708%  
 (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0057)  
NO 3.089% 3.138% 2.938% 3.889% 4.329%  
 (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)  













Table 1.7 Attention responses to macro news 
In this table, I compare investors' average attention on firm-days with macro news announcements and firm-days 
without macro news announcements. Weekends are excluded. In Panel A, I report the result for the full sample. In 
Panel B, I sort firms into five size groups in each June based on NYSE breakpoints. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. In testing the differences in means, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered 
by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Macro news 
announcement day 
Count Mean SD P25 Median P75 
YES 1422951 3.86% 26.96% -9.97% 1.96% 14.74% 
NO 589909 3.12% 27.71% -10.85% 1.59% 14.68% 
DIF(YES-NO)  0.74%***     
       
Panel B: By size 
 Size group: NYSE breakpoints  
Macro news 
announcement day 
1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5(Largest) DIF(5-1) 
YES 3.24% 3.28% 3.15% 4.11% 4.98%  
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)  
NO 2.80% 2.93% 2.53% 3.55% 3.50%  
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)  















Table 1.8 Attention response to earnings announcements: the effect of macro news 
In this table, I compare investors' AbnAttention to earnings announcements on firm-days with and without macro 
news.  In Panel A, I report the result for the full sample. In Panel B, I sort firms into five size groups in each June 
based on NYSE breakpoints. Standard errors are in parentheses. In testing the differences in means, standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Macro news 
announcement day 
Count Mean SD P25 Median P75 
YES Macro 24798 8.97% 34.69% -7.98% 4.04% 17.89% 
NO Macro 5820 10.56% 35.10% -6.91% 5.43% 19.42% 
DIF(YES-NO)  -1.59%**     
       
Panel B: By size 
 Size group: NYSE breakpoints  
Macro news 
announcement day 
1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5(Largest) DIF(5-1) 
YES Macro 4.766% 8.805% 6.258% 9.242% 20.776%  
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.013)  
NO Macro 4.316% 5.139% 4.682% 7.313% 19.453%  
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)  








Table 1.9 Attention response to earnings announcements: the effect of important macro 
news 
In this table, I compare investors' AbnAttention to earnings announcements on days with five of the most 
important macro news with days without any macro announcements.  In Panel A, I report the result for the full 
sample. In Panel B, I sort firms into five size groups in each June based on NYSE breakpoints. The p-values are 
calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Important macro 
news day Count Mean SD P25 Median P75 
YES Macro 14187 8.12% 33.89% -8.47% 3.40% 16.93% 
NO Macro 5820 10.56% 35.10% -6.91% 5.43% 19.42% 
DIF(YES-NO)  -2.44%***     
       
Panel B: By size 
 Size group: NYSE breakpoints  
Important macro 
news day 1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5(Largest) DIF(5-1) 
YES Macro 4.135% 4.934% 4.370% 6.205% 17.893%  
 (0.0055) (0.0051) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0083)  
NO Macro 4.766% 8.805% 6.258% 9.242% 20.776%  
 (0.0081) (0.0092) (0.0075) (0.0094) (0.0132)  













Table 1.10 Regression analysis: the determinants of abnormal attention 
This table presents regression analysis of investors’ attention. The dependent variable, LogAttentioni,t is the 
logarithmic transformation of 1+AbnAttention. Ii,tearnings is a dummy variable that equals to one when there is an 
earnings announcement for firm i on day t and zero otherwise, and Ii,tmacro is a dummy that equals to one when there 
is macro news announcement on day t and zero otherwise. Ilarge is a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
firm in the largest size quintile, and 0 otherwise. Detailed variables are summarized in Appendix 1.1. P-values are 
calculated using robust standard errors clustered by firm and by day, in parentheses. *, **, and ***represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2013. 
 Dependent variable: LogAttention 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Iearnings 0.126***  0.204*** 0.0927*** 0.0939*** 0.174*** 0.117*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Imacro  0.119*** 0.119*** 0.0254*** 0.0255*** 0.110*** 0.0618*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
Iearnings * Imacro   -0.142*** -0.0442*** -0.0450*** -0.136*** -0.0970*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ilarge      -0.0248 -0.0249 
      (0.117) (0.116) 
Iearnings * Ilarge      0.132*** 0.133*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Imacro * Ilarge      0.0368*** 0.0368*** 
      (0.002) (0.002) 
Iearnings * Imacro * 
Ilarge 
     -0.0303 -0.028 
      (0.130) (0.164) 
Ln(Size)     0.00217                  
     (0.513)                  
B/M     -0.00048  -0.00066 
     (0.753)  (0.674) 
Day of week 
fixed effect 
NO NO NO YES YES NO YES    
Month fixed 
effect 






Table 1.11 Regression Analysis of Attention response to earnings announcements 
This table analyzes the determinants of investors’ attention to earnings announcements. The sample includes 
27,337 quarterly earnings announcements. The dependent variable, LogAttentioni,t is the logarithmic 
transformation of 1+AbnAttention. Variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. P-values are calculated using robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and by day, in parentheses.  For each earnings announcement, I record the 
AbnAttention on the first trading day after the announcement. *, **, and ***represent significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2013. 
Dependent variable: ln(1+AbnAttention) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Imacro  -0.0223*** -0.0271*** 
  (0.009) (0.008) 
Ilarge   0.0743*** 
   (0.000) 
Imacro * Ilarge   0.013 
   (0.409) 
Ln(Size) 0.0365*** 0.0364***  
 (0.000) (0.000)  
Absolute earnings surprise 0.471*** 0.472*** 0.401*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(# of earnings announcement) -0.0134** -0.0122* -0.0125* 
 (0.036) (0.059) (0.062) 
Ln(1+ of analyst following) 0.0180** 0.0181** 0.0372*** 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.000) 
Book/Market -0.0111 -0.0107 -0.0207* 
 (0.371) (0.387) (0.097) 
Day of week fixed effect YES YES YES 







Table 1.12 Trading volume (AbnTurnover) on earnings announcement days with and without macro news announcements 
In this table, I compare trading volume on earnings announcement days with and without macro news announcements. Each quarter, I group earnings 
announcements in each earnings surprise decile into those that are announced on days with macro news and those that are not. I then calculate average 
AbnTurnover for each group and take the time-series average. To test if the difference in mean is significantly smaller than zero, I calculate the time-series 




Total 1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10(Largest) 
YES 0.0181 0.0255 0.0191 0.0173 0.0149 0.0148 0.0157 0.0159 0.0154 0.0179 0.0253 
NO 0.0203 0.0298 0.0199 0.0185 0.0157 0.0150 0.0181 0.0204 0.0178 0.0207 0.0286 



























Appendix 1.1 Variable definition 
SVI The number of hits on Google Searches for a term on day t divided by the 
highest daily number of hits during the period the user specify 
AbnAttention The difference between daily SVI and the average SVI from day -360 to day 
-31scaled by the average.  
LogAttention Logarithm of AbnAttention plus one  
Earnings surprise (Actual EPS-Median forecasted EPS in 90 days before the 
announcement)/Fiscal quarter-end stock price 
Absolute earnings surprise Absolute value of earnings surprise 
Iearnings   A dummy variable that equals one if there is an earnings announcement on a 
firm-day and zero otherwise 
Imacro A dummy variable that equals one if there is at least one macro news 
announcement on a firm-day and zero otherwise 
Ilarge A dummy variable that equals one if a firm is in the top size quintile 
according to NYSE breakpoints. Portfolio formed at the end of each June.  
Size Market capitalization calculated at the end of each June 
Ln(size) Natural logarithm of market capitalization.  
Ln(1+# of analyst following) Natural logarithm of number of analysts that forecasted the quarterly earnings 
90 days prior to the actual announcement day. 
Ln(# of earnings announcements) Natural logarithm of number of earnings announcements recorded in I/B/E/S 
on a day. After-hours or holiday earnings announcements are counted on the 
following trading day 
Book/Market Book to market ratio. Book value calculated in each December and Market 








End date Time Relevance Day 
Quarterly Announcements 
GDP Advance 40 1/30/04 11/7/13 8:30 96.61 
Around 27th of the Jan, 
April, July, Oct 
GDP Preliminary 40 2/27/04 12/5/13 8:30 96.61 
Around 29th of Feb, May, 
Aug, Nov 
GDP Final 39 3/25/04 12/20/13 8:30 96.61 
Around 28th of March, 




40 1/30/04 11/7/13 8:30 67.63 
Around 27th of the Jan, 




40 2/27/04 12/5/13 8:30 67.63 




39 3/25/04 12/20/13 8:30 67.63 
Around 28th of March, 
June, Sep, Dec 
       
Monthly Announcements 
Nonfarm Payrolls 120 1/9/04 12/6/13 8:30 99.15 First Friday of the month 
ISM Manufacturing 120 1/2/04 12/2/13 10:00 95.76 




119 1/27/04 12/31/13 10:00 94.92 Around 25h of the month 
Consumer Price 
Index 
119 1/15/04 12/17/13 8:30 93.22 Around 16th of the month 
Durable Goods 
Orders 
119 1/28/04 12/24/13 8:30 91.53 Around 26th of the month 
New Home Sales 118 2/26/04 12/24/13 10:00 90.68 17th workday of the month 
Retail Sales  119 1/15/04 12/12/13 8:30 89.83 
Around the 12th of the 
month 
Unemployment Rate 120 1/9/04 12/6/13 8:30 89.24 First Friday of the month 
Housing Starts 119 1/21/04 12/18/13 8:30 88.98 
2nd or 3rd week after the 
reporting month 
Existing Home Sales 106 2/25/05 12/19/13 10:00 88.14 
Around the 25th of the 
month 
Industrial Production  119 1/16/04 12/16/13 9:15 87.29 
Around the 15th of the 
month 
Factory Orders 120 1/6/04 12/5/13 10:00 85.59 
Around the first business 
day of the month 
Personal Income 119 2/2/04 12/23/13 8:30 84.75 
Around the 1st business 
day of the month 
Personal Spending 119 2/2/04 12/23/13 8:30 84.75 
Around the first or last 
business day of the month 
Producer Price Index 119 1/14/04 12/13/13 8:30 83.9 3rd week of each month 
Leading Index 119 38008 41627 10:00 83.05 
Around the first business 















End date Time Relevance Day 
Monthly Announcements 
Trade Balance 120 1/14/04 12/4/13 8:30 82.2 
Around the 20th of the 
month 
Construction Spending 120 1/5/04 12/2/13 10:00 77.97 Around 1st/2nd of the month 
Monthly Budget 
Statement 
120 1/15/04 12/11/13 Varying 74.58 
Around the third week of the 
month for the prior month 
ISM Non-Manufacture 
Composite 
71 2/5/08 12/4/13 10:00 73.73 
3rd business day of the 
month 
Building Permits 119 1/21/04 12/18/13 8:30 62.29 18th workday of the month 
Capacity Utilization 119 1/16/04 12/16/13 9:15 61.1 
Around 15th/16th of the 
month 
Consumer Credit 120 1/8/04 12/6/13 0.625 38.98 
Around 5th business day of 
the month 
Business Inventories 119 1/16/04 12/12/13 8:30/10:00 36.44 
Around the 15th of the 
month 
Weekly announcements 
Initial Jobless Claims 518 1/8/04 12/26/13 8:30 98.31 Each Thursday 
Money Stock 510 1/2/04 12/26/13 16:30 NA Each Thursday 
       
Six-week announcements 



















Appendix 1.3 AbnAttention on days with and without earnings announcement, excluding 
weekends and macro announcement days 
In this table, I compare investors' average AbnAttention on days with earnings announcements and days without 
earnings announcements. Firm-days with macro news announcements and weekends are excluded. In Panel A, I 
report the result for the full sample. In Panel B, I sort firms into five size groups in each June based on NYSE 
breakpoints. The p-values are calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample 
Earnings announcement 
day 
Count Mean SD P25 Median P75 
YES 5797 10.57% 35.13% -6.86% 5.42% 19.42% 
NO 584112 3.05% 27.64% -10.88% 1.56% 14.64% 
DIF(YES-NO)  7.52%***     
       
Panel B: By size 
 Size group: NYSE breakpoints  
Earnings announcement 
day 
1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5(Largest) DIF(5-1) 
YES 4.755% 8.841% 6.171% 9.236% 20.840%  
 (0.0081) (0.0093) (0.0075) (0.0094) (0.0132)  
NO 2.788% 2.882% 2.502% 3.491% 3.350%  
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)  















Appendix 1.4 AbnAttention on days with and without macro news announcement 
In this table, I compare investors' average attention on days with macro news announcements and days without 
macro news announcements. Firm-days with earnings announcements and weekends are excluded. In Panel A, I 
report the result for the full sample. In Panel B, I sort firms into five size groups in each June based on NYSE 
breakpoints. The p-values are calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Full sample   
Macro news 
announcement day 
Count Mean SD P25 Median P75 
YES 1398153 3.77% 26.82% -10.01% 1.92% 14.69% 
NO 584112 3.05% 27.64% -10.88% 1.56% 14.64% 
DIF(YES-NO)  0.719%***         
       
Panel B: By size 
 Size group: NYSE breakpoints  
Macro news 
announcement day 
1(Smallest) 2 3 4 5(Largest) DIF(5-1) 
YES 3.21% 3.24% 3.12% 4.05% 4.74%  
 (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)  
NO 2.79% 2.88% 2.50% 3.49% 3.35%  
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)  





2  Chapter 2: Investor inattention and merger announcements 
2.1 Introduction 
Prior literature has documented that investors have limited attention. Such limited attention 
affects stock prices and investors’ trading behavior (See, for example, Barber and Odean(2008), 
Dellavigna and Pollet(2009), Da, Engelberg and Gao(2011), Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh(2009), 
Loh(2010), Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock(2012), Peng(2005), Peng and Xiong (2006)). Most 
of the empirical tests have been performed on pre-scheduled corporate events, in particular, 
earnings announcements. Little evidence has been provided on unscheduled events such as 
merger and acquisition announcements, one of the largest and most important corporate events.  
Presumably, large corporate events always attract sufficient investor attention, and price 
discovery is fast and accurate. However, M&A announcements are usually complex, and 
investors need to analyze many aspects of a transaction such as the synergy from the merger, the 
value of the deal, and the probability that the deal will complete.  Also, M&As often come in 
waves (See, for example, Harford (2005), Martynova and Renneboog (2008)), and hundreds of 
M&As are sometimes announced on one day with huge variations in deal characteristics and firm 
characteristics3. A typical investor has to make a decision as to which deals to pay attention to. 
Therefore, it is plausible that investor attention needs to be allocated to M&A announcements 
and that such allocation has an impact on asset prices and trading behaviors.  
In this chapter, I use an investor attention measure based on daily Google searches of a firm’s 
stock ticker symbol and examine investor attention around merger announcements and its impact 
                                                     
3 For example, Wall Street has the phenomenon called “Merger Monday”, whereby hundreds of deals are announced 




on asset prices. Specifically, I ask three questions. First, what is the timing and magnitude of 
investor attention around merger announcements?  Second, what are the determinants of the 
cross-section of investor attention to merger announcements? Third, does investor attention 
affect stock market reactions? In particular, does it affect trading volume and stock returns? 
Following Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011), I use an attention measure based on Google search 
frequency for a public firms’ ticker symbol. I construct an abnormal attention measure for 2,259 
US common stocks4 and then extract 1,906 merger announcements in which the sample firms are 
either the target or the acquirer. For every deal, I observe acquirer characteristics, target 
characteristics, and deal characteristics. However, because many targets and acquirers are private 
firms or foreign firms, and my sample is quite restricted even for US public firms, I do not 
observe investor attention for all target firms and acquirer firms. My sample covers acquirer 
firms in 1,311 announcements, target firms in 496 deals announcements, and both target firms 
and acquirer firms in 99 announcements.  I refer to the 595 target firms with AbnAttention 
measures as AttTargets, and the 1,410 acquirer firms with AbnAttention measure as 
AttAcquirers.  
In the first phase, I examine the timing and magnitude of investor attention to AttTarget and 
AttAcquirer firms. For AttTarget firms, I find that investor attention increases significantly in the 
five days prior to the announcement, and peaks on the announcement day. Prior literature 
documents a significant price run-up and abnormal trading activity for target firms prior to 
merger announcements, and shows that the run-up is concentrated in the preceding five days 
((Betton, Eckbo, Thorburn (2008); King and Padalko (2005)). Some papers argue that the price 
                                                     
4 I start with 7296 US common stocks and the restrictions that Google search data is available and that symbol 




run-up is caused by illegal insider trading (Chakravarty and McConnell(1997), Fishe and 
Robe(2004)). Others argue that it is because investors are able to predict the upcoming 
announcements from various sources such as analyst forecasts, technical analysis, and rumors in 
the financial media (Ahern and Sosyura (2014), King and Padalko (2005), and they trade 
accordingly.  To the extent that the significant increase in internet searches needs to be supported 
by a large population and is unlikely to be driven by a few insiders, my results suggest that the 
price run-up can be partially explained by market anticipation of the deals. This is not surprising 
given that the negotiation process for a typical merger starts 90 days prior to the official 
announcement and many parties are involved in this process. With the advent of social media, it 
is quite challenging to lock up the information. For AttAcquirer firms, I document a marginally 
significant increase in investor attention on the announcement day, but not prior to the 
announcements. The results do not necessarily mean that investors do not predict the identity of 
the acquirers, but it could be due to a size effect. This makes sense because, assuming the firms 
in my sample are similar in size, AttAcquirers tend to acquire smaller firms and AttTargets tend 
to be acquired by larger firms. As I will show in section 1.5, investors pay more attention to large 
deals. It is also possible that target firms generally attract more attention than acquirer firms 
because targets typically experience significant positive returns and big changes in firm structure 
(Betton and Thorburn (2008)) while acquirers have insignificant stock returns and minimal 
changes in firm structure. Since I cannot distinguish between the two explanations, I do not draw 
strong conclusions on the pre-announcement attention to acquirers. I would like to mention that 
Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2012) also examine investor attention around merger 
announcements and find no evidence of a significant attention increase in the pre-announcement 




are examining attention to only acquirer firms (large firms in S&P500 index are more likely to be 
acquirers) and as my results suggest, acquirers generally do not receive abnormal attention prior 
to announcements.  
In the second phase, I examine the determinants of the cross-section of investor attention to 
merger announcements.  I focus on AttTarget firms because as I have discussed, investor 
attention is much higher for these firms, and my results on AttAcquirer firms are only marginally 
significant. I regress investor attention to AttTargets on acquirer firm characteristics, target firm 
characteristics, and deal characteristics. The results show that investor attention increases 
significantly with target firm size and transaction value. This could be explained by the fact that 
merger announcements involving large, well know firms are more likely to receive media 
coverage (Ahern and Sosyura (2014)).  
In the third phase, I investigate the impact of investor attention on stock market reactions. I 
focus on the stock returns and trading volume of AttTarget firms because previous literature 
agrees that the average announcement returns for target firms are positive and significant (See, 
for example, Bargeron et al. (2008), Betton et al. (2008)). However, the evidence on the 
announcement returns for acquirer firms is mixed, ranging from negative return to insignificant 
positive, and the direction of return depends on the method of payment, whether the target firms 
are public, and acquirer size (See, for example, Bradley and Sundaram(2006), Moeller et al. 
(2007)). My hypothesis is that the trading volume and stock return of AttTarget firms increase 
with investor attention.   
There are two possible reasons for this. On one hand, excessive investor attention can lead to 
over-reaction. Barber and Odean (2008) argue that investors are net buyers of attention-grabbing 




often choose the one that catches their attention. When they sell, due to short sale constraints, 
they generally choose from the few stocks that they own. The implication is that buying pressure 
caused by investor attention can lead to over-reaction to information. Da, Engelberg, and Gao 
(2011) provide strong support for this argument and they find that an increase in SVI predicts 
higher stock prices in the two weeks following the increase with an eventual price reversal 
within the year. On the other hand, many papers argue that limited attention leads to 
underreaction to news. Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009), Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) both find 
that the immediate price reaction is weaker and post-earnings announcement drift is stronger 
when investors are distracted. Both arguments predict a positive relationship between 
announcement returns and investor attention.  
To test this hypothesis, I first perform univariate analysis by assigning AttTarget firms into 
quartiles according to the attention they receive on the announcement day, and then compare 
portfolio returns and trading volume. I document that the stock return is more positive and 
trading volume is higher when investors pay more attention. This result holds in multivariate 
analysis that includes acquirer characteristics, target characteristics, and transaction 
characteristics. However, I am not able to distinguish between the overreaction and under-
reaction explanation. Unlike in the setting of earnings announcements where I can do so by 
examining the post-earnings announcement price reaction5, mergers are associated with 
continuous information flows and prices adjust accordingly. The price may drop subsequent to 
the announcement because the proposed merger is rejected by shareholders or prevented by 
regulators. The price may continue to increase because the bidder increases the offer price or a 
                                                     
5 If the price continue to drift in the direction of earnings surprise, it suggests an initial under-reaction and if it the 




new bidder shows up. Ideally, I can analyze a sample of transactions that are completed without 
subsequent new information flows, but the related information is limited; even if I do so, the 
sample size will be quite small and prevent us from making convincing arguments.  
One may be concerned about reverse causality. Rather than attention affecting stock returns, it 
is plausible that higher announcement returns result in higher investor attention. To address this 
concern, I assign firms into portfolios according to their announcement day return and then 
compare announcement day attention. I find no significant difference between investor attention 
to the highest return group and other firms, suggesting that reverse causality is not a concern.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the related literature. 
Section 2.3 discusses data sources and sample construction. Section 2.4 analyzes the patterns of 
investor attention around merger announcements. Section 2.5 analyzes the cross-section of 
investor attention to merger announcements. Section 2.6 studies the impact of limited attention 
on asset prices and trading behaviors. Section 2.7 concludes the paper.  
2.2 Literature review 
My paper relates to a growing literature on investor attention. Peng (2005) models investors’ 
endogenous attention allocation and predicts that investor attention increases when the 
uncertainty level is high. This chapter studies investor limited attention in one of the most 
important corporate events, merger announcements, and provides evidence on the determinants 
of investor attention allocation around mergers.   
Previous literature has also studied the impact of limited investor attention on asset prices and 
investor trading behavior. Barber and Odean (2008) show that individual investors’ are net 
buyers of attention-grabbing stocks. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) also provide strong support 




attention and find that an increase in SVI predicts higher stock prices in the following two weeks 
and an eventual price reversal within the year.  
Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) argue that investor limited 
attention could explain the underreaction to earnings announcements. They find that lower 
attention leads to a lower immediate reaction to earnings announcements, but stronger post-
earnings announcement drift. Dellavigna and Pollet (2009) use Friday as an exogenous variation 
in the level of investor attention and Hirshleifer et al. (2009) use the number of earnings 
announcements as a proxy for the distraction of investor attention. Papers have tested this 
hypothesis in stock recommendations (Loh (2010)) and merger announcements (Louis and Sun 
(2010)) and reached the same conclusions. Louis and Sun (2010) compares merger 
announcements made on Friday with those on other days and find that Friday announcements are 
associated with less trading volume and less pronounced acquirer abnormal returns. In particular, 
they find that the acquirers’ average abnormal return is less positive for announcements 
involving privately owned targets and less negative for those involving publicly owned targets 
when the announcements are announced on Fridays than when they are made on the other 
business days. My paper provides strong evidence that investor attention affects stock price 
reactions.  
This chapter also contributes to the literature that studies the pre-announcement price run-up 
for target firms. Some papers argue that the price run-up is caused by illegal insider trading 
(Fishe and Robe(2004)) while others argue that investors are able to predict the upcoming 
announcements from various sources such as analyst forecasts, technical analysis, and rumors in 




activities leads to the price increase. My paper provides evidence to support the market 
anticipation view.  
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Measure of investor attention 
My main variable of interest, abnormal investor attention (AbnAttention), is constructed using 
search frequency data from Google (Search Volume Index (SVI)). See Section 1.3 for a detailed 
description. 
2.3.2 Sample selection  
I start with 7296 US common stocks6 that are included in CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database 
from January 1, 2004, the first day when Google Trends data became available, to December 31, 
2014. I then impose the following restrictions on the sample: (1) search data is available for a 
stock’s ticker symbol from Google Trends. Unfortunately, when a ticker is seldom searched, 
Google Trends returns missing values, (2) the ticker associated with the stock must not have a 
generic meaning7.  The final sample consists of 2,8785,82 firm-weekday observations for 2,259 
common stocks. I excluded all firm-weekends from the analysis because most announcements 
about major corporate events occur on weekdays and investor attention to the stock market on 
weekends is extremely low compared to weekdays.8 
I then extract 1,906 unique merger announcements from Thomason Financial’s Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum database that satisfies the following conditions: (1) the acquirer firm or 
                                                     
6 Share code disclosed in CRSP database is 10 or 11. 
7 4939 stocks are dropped because of missing SVI, and 98 stocks are dropped because of tickers with generic 
meanings. 
8 We start with 4030037 firm-day observations and 1151455 firm week-ends are excluded from the analysis. Liu and 




the target firm is in my sample, (2) the deal is classified as merger or tender offer 9. For each deal, 
I obtain the target financial characteristics, acquirer financial characteristics, and deal 
characteristics. Because many target firms and acquirers are private firms or foreign firms and my 
sample is quite restricted. Even for US public firms, I do not observe investor attention for all 
target firms and acquirer firms. My sample covers acquirer firms but not target firms in 1311 
announcements, target firms but not acquirer firms only in 496 announcements, and both target 
firms and acquirer firms in 99 announcements.  In the end, 2055 firm-days in my sample feature 
merger announcements. I refer to the 595 target firms with AbnAttention measure as AttTarget, 
and the 1410 acquirer firms with AbnAttention measure as AttAcquirer. My sample size is 
comparable to Deng, Kang, and Low (2013). 
In Panel A of Table 2.1, I present the distribution of merger announcements by acquirer industry 
and year. During my sample period, the year 2014 witnessed the most mergers, followed by the 
year 2007 and year 2010. Most of the acquirers are in manufacturing (38.9%), finance, insurance, 
and real estate (24.9%), and services (17.8%) industries.  Panel B of Table 2.1 presents summary 
statistics for the key variables: AbnAttention, target firm financial characteristics, acquirer firm 
financial characteristics, and deal characteristics. Because financial information is often missing 
in SDC, the number of observations for many variables are less than 1,906. Several features are 
worth noting. The mean of AbnAttention on a weekday is 3.97%. The mean is larger than zero 
because when I construct AbnAttention, weekends are included to capture the baseline level of 
attention, but I exclude weekends in the actual analysis. Acquirer firm net sales are 17.75 billion 
                                                     
9 Following Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008), I start by downloading all mergers (form M), acquisition of 
majority interest (AM), acquisition of partial interest (AP), and acquisition of remaining interest (AR)9. I exclude all 
transactions classified as exchange offers, acquisition of assets, acquisition of certain assets, buybacks, recaps, and 
acquisition. To identify mergers and tender offers, I do the following: if the tender flag is “no” and the deal form is a 




in mean (3.34 billion) for acquirers and target firm net sales are 3.472 billion in mean (419 million 
in median), suggesting that, on average, acquirers are much larger than targets in size. Acquirer 
return on equity (ROE) is 12% in mean (12% in median), and target ROE is -3% in mean (8% in 
median), suggesting that acquirers are more profitable than targets.  
2.4 The timing and magnitude of investor attention around merger 
announcements 
I begin my analysis by examining the timing and magnitude of investor attention around merger 
announcements. I perform both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. In the univariate 
analysis, I use the AbnAttention measure to facilitate the interpretation of results, and in the 
multivariate analysis, I take the logarithm of AbnAttention plus one to make the distribution of the 
variable close to normal.  
2.4.1 Univariate analysis 
I examine investor attention in the pre-event period, on the event day, and in the post-event period 
by comparing investor attention in the windows [-5,-1], [0], [1, 5] on weekdays relative to the 
announcements with attention on a quiet day. A quiet day is any firm-weekday that is outside the 
[-5, 5] window relative to major corporate events including merger announcements, earnings 
announcements, and seasoned equity offering.  
In Panel A of Table 2.2, I show that on a quiet weekday, AbnAttention is 3.673%, suggesting 
that on a typical quiet day, investor attention is 3.673% higher than its normal level. Again, this is 
higher than zero because of my construction of the AbnAttention variable as discussed earlier. 
In Panel B, I calculate the average AbnAttention for AttTargets and AttAcquirers in the five 
weekdays before announcements, on the announcement day, and in the five weekdays after the 




standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. I find that, compared to a 
quiet day, attention to AttTargets is 1.66% higher in the pre-event period, 14.62% higher on the 
event day, and 3.701% higher in the post-event period. The differences are all significant at the 1% 
level. Compared to a quiet day, attention to AttAcquirers is not significantly different in the pre-
event period, but it is 3.98% higher on the event day and 1.36% higher in the post-event period. 
The results suggest that there is a run-up in AbnAttention to AttTargets of merger announcements. 
It could potentially explain the well-documented price run-up of target firms before merger 
announcements. 
For AttAcquirer firms, I document a marginally significant increase in investor attention on the 
announcement day, but no increase before the announcements. The results do not necessarily mean 
that investors do not anticipate the identity of the acquirers, but it could be due to a size effect. In 
the untabulated analysis, I find that the transaction size involving AttAcquirers is smaller than the 
ones involving AttTargets. This makes sense because assuming the firms in my sample are similar 
in size; AttAcquirers tend to acquire smaller firms, and AttTargets tend to be acquired by larger 
firms. As I will show in section 5, investors pay more attention to large deals. It is also possible 
that target firms attract more attention than acquirer firms because targets typically experience 
significant positive return and potential changes in firm structures (Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 
(2008)) while acquirers have insignificant stock return and minimal changes in firm structure. 
Since I cannot distinguish between the two explanations, I do not draw strong conclusions on the 
pre-announcement attention to acquirers.  
In Panel C, I compare the AbnAttention investors pay to AttAcquirers and AttTargets. It shows 
that on average, AbnAttention is 19.36% for AttTargets and 8.83% for AttAcquirers. The simple 




am comparing targets and acquirers in different deals and that transaction characteristics drive the 
difference. For example, large deals potentially attract more attention. To address this concern, I 
test the difference using Abadie and Imbens (2002) matching estimators. The idea behind this 
estimator is that for each treated firm (in my case, the target firm), I look for control firms (in my 
case, acquirer firms) that best match the treated firm in multiple dimensions. I match each 
AttTarget with an AttAcquirer firms by transaction size.  I find that the difference reduces to 5.6%, 
and is marginally significant at the 10% level. The results show that investors pay more attention 
to acquirer than to target firms. 
2.4.2 Multivariate analysis 
To control for other possible determinants of investor attention, I then conduct the multivariate 
analysis. The dependent variable is LogAttention, defined as log (AbnAttention+1). I make the 
logarithmic transformation so that the distribution of the dependent variable is closer to a normal 
distribution.  
Following Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2012), I regress LogAttention on indicator variables 
for the five weekdays period prior to the event (day [-5, -1]), the event day (day [0]), the five 
weekday post-event period (day [1, 5]), and a series of control variables. To separately examine 
investor attention to target firms and acquirer firms around merger announcements, I create these 
indicators for AttTarget firms and AttAcquirer firms separately. Liu and Peng (2015) find that 
investor attention increases significantly following earnings announcements and macro news 
releases. Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock (2012) find that investor attention is persistently high 
for the period of five days before and post pre-scheduled events. To control for the effect of other 
information shocks, I also create indicator variables for earnings announcements, seasoned equity 




The model is as follows:  
LogAttention=β0+β1Merger announcement-AttTarget [-5,-1t+β2Merger Announcement- 
AttTarget [0]t 
+ β3Merger Announcement- AttTarget [+1, +5]t 
+ β4 Merger announcement-AttAcquirer [-5,-1]+β5Merger Announcement- AttAcquirer [0]t 
+ β6 Merger announcement- AttAcquirer [-5,-1]t 
+β7Earnings announcement [-5,-1]t+β8 Earnings Announcement[0]t+β9 Earnings 
Announcement[+1,+5]t 
+ β10 Seasoned equity offering [-5,-1]t+β11Seasoned equity offering [0]t+β12 Seasoned equity 
offering[+1,+5]t 
+ β13 Macro news announcements+ β14Controls +ε                           (1) 
where, Controls is a set of control variables including a macro news announcement day dummy, 
firm size, lag(abnormal return), lag(return volatility), lag(abnormal trading volume), lag(market 
return), day of week dummies, and month of year dummies. All variables are defined in Appendix 
2.1.  
The results are presented in Table 2.3. Consistent with the univariate analysis, I find that 
AttTarget firms attract significant pre-event abnormal attention (β1=0.0571, p<0.01) and 
announcement attention (β2=0.155, p<0.01). Post-event attention is no different from a quiet day 
after controlling for other factors. Investor attention to AttAcquirer firms is concentrated in the 
post-announcement period (β6=0.0296, p<0.05). Consistent with Drake, Roulstone, and Thornock 




investor attention from several days before the events to the several days after the events. Overall, 
my results suggest that investors pay close attention to target firms before merger announcements 
and on the day of merger announcements.  
2.5 Cross-section of investor attention to merger announcements 
In this section, I set up a model to examine the determinants of investor attention to AttTargets 
in merger announcements. I focus on target firms because as I have discussed, investor attention 
is much higher to AttTarget firms, and my results on AttAcquirers are only marginally significant. 
The model I use is, 
AbnAttentioni,t= β0+β1Acquirer characteristicsi+ β2Target characteristicsi+ β3Deal 
characteristics+ ε  (2) 
Acquirer characteristics include acquirer firm size, a dummy that indicates whether the acquirer 
is a high-tech firm, a dummy that indicates whether the acquirer is a public firm, and acquirer 
profitability measured by return on equity (ROE). Target characteristics include target firm size, a 
dummy that indicates whether the target is a high-tech firm, and target profitability measured by 
return on equity (ROE). Deal related characteristics include transaction value, initial offer 
premium defined as the percentage difference between initial offer price and target stock price in 
the day prior to the announcement, a dummy that indicates whether the deal is a tender offer, a 
dummy that indicates whether the deal is a diversifying deal, and a dummy that indicates whether 
the deal is financed 100% in cash. Because the regression analysis requires target financial 
information, acquirer financial information, and deal-related information, my tests are conducted 




The results are reported in Table 2.4. Transaction value and target firm size both positively 
predict investor attention to AttTargets. This could be explained by the fact that merger 
announcements involving large, well-known firms are more likely to receive media coverage 
(Ahern and Sosyura (2014). The coefficient on public acquirer is negative, suggesting that 
AttTargets attract more attention when they are acquired by private firms.  
2.6 Market reaction to merger announcements 
In this section, I analyze the effect of investor attention on stock market reactions to merger 
announcements. I focus on the stock return and trading volume of AttTarget firms because 
previous literature agrees that the average announcement return for target firms is positive and 
significant (See, for example, Bargeron et al. (2008), Betton et al. (2008)). However, the evidence 
on the announcement return for acquirer firms is mixed, ranging from negative to insignificantly 
positive, and the direction of return depends on the method of payment, whether the target firm is 
public or private, and acquirer size (See, for example, Bradley and Sundaram (2006), Savor (2009), 
Moeller et al.(2007), Betton et al. (2008)). My hypothesis is that the stock return and trading 
volume of AttTargets increase with investor attention. 
2.6.1 Announcement return 
Following Hirshleifer et al.(2009), the cumulative abnormal returns on the announcement day 
and the day that follows are defined as the difference between the buy-and-hold return of the 
announcing firm and that of a five by five size and book-to-market (B/M)10 matched  portfolio 
over the window [0,1] in trading days relative to the announcement date, 
                                                     





CAR [0, 1] iq= (1+ri0)(1+ri1)-(1+rp0)(1+ri1) 
where ri is the return of firm i and rp is the return of the size and B/M matched portfolio.  
I first present the univariate analysis in Table 2.5. I sort all of the AttTarget firms into quartiles 
according to the AbnAttention they receive on the announcement date. For each group, I then 
calculate the average CAR[0,1] and test the difference in CAR[0,1] between the top quartile group 
and other groups. 
The results show that the CAR[0,1] almost monotonically increases with investor attention, from 
18.32% in the bottom quartile to 23.82% in the top quartile. The median return displays a similar 
pattern, from 15% to 17.18%. In the last row of Panel A, I show that the difference between the 
top quartile and other firms is 5.5%, and it is significant at the 5% confidence interval.  
To control for other possible determinants of announcement returns, I perform multivariate 
analysis in Table 2.6. I do so by regressing cumulative returns for AttTargets on a dummy that 
equals to one if the firm is in the top quartile according to the attention they receive on the 
announcement day and zero otherwise, and a set of controls including acquirer characteristics, 
target characteristics, and deal characteristics.  
CAR[0,1]=β0+β1High AbnAttention+β2Acquirer characteristics+ β3Target characteristics+ 
β4Deal characteristics+ ε    (3) 
The control variables are the same as the ones in equation 2. The results are reported in Table 
2.6. The coefficient on the high attention dummy is positive (0.0383, p=0.027), suggesting that the 
announcement return of AttTargets increases with investor attention. Larger firms have lower 
announcement returns, and high-tech target firms have higher stock returns. Unsurprisingly, a 




One may be concerned about reverse causality. Rather than higher attention leading to higher 
stock returns, it is plausible that higher announcement returns cause greater investor attention. To 
address this concern, I assign firms into four groups according to their stock returns on the 
announcement day and then calculate average the AbnAttention for each group. If returns drive 
investor attention, I should expect investor attention in the highest return group to be significantly 
higher than that in other groups. Results in Table 2.7 shows that although AbnAttention is higher 
in the highest return group than that in other groups, the difference is not significant.   
Overall, my results suggest that higher investor attention leads to higher announcement day 
returns for target firms.  
2.6.2 Trading volume 
I define abnormal trading volume as the difference between turnover on a particular day and the 
average daily turnover over the past 252 trading days, skipping the most recent 20 trading days: 
AbnTurnover i,t=Turnover i,t -Average turnover i, (t-21, t-252) 
Table 2.8 shows that the AbnTurnover almost monotonically increases with investor attention, 
from 0.108 in the bottom quartile to 0.216 in the top quartile. The median return displays a similar 
pattern, from 0.053 to 0.151. In the last row of Table 2.8, I show that the difference between the 
top quartile and other firms is 0.0912, and it is significant at the 1% confidence interval. I also 
perform multivariate analysis in Table 2.9. The results confirm my univariate analysis.  
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter studies investor attention around merger announcements and its impact on asset 
prices. I find that investor attention to target firms increases before merger announcements. 




much stronger for target firms and large deals. I also document that the stock return response and 
abnormal trading volume are more pronounced when investor attention is high. In particular, the 
stock return for target firms is less positive when investor attention is lower. I provide evidence 
on investors’ allocation decisions and the impact these decisions have on asset prices and trading 
behavior.  My results also provide support to the market anticipation explanation for the pre-






Table 2.1 Summary statistics 
Panel A: Sample distribution by year and industry 
The sample consists of 2878582 firm-weekday observations for 2259 common stocks that satisfy the following conditions: (1) the stock is in CCM database, 
(2) search data is available for the stock's ticker symbol from Google Trends, (3) the stock's ticker must not have a generic meaning. I then extract 1906 
merger announcements (mergers or tender offers) made between 2005 and 2014 that involves firms in my sample. M&A related information is from 
Thomason Financial's Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum database. In Panel A, I tabulate the number of M&A deals by year and by industry. In Panel 
B, I provide summary statistics for key variables. All the variable definitions are in Appendix 2.1. 























retail trade  Total 
2005 0 31 39 6 0 19 7 6 108 
2006 0 52 75 6 0 28 5 10 176 
2007 0 63 86 12 0 34 7 16 218 
2008 0 50 80 11 0 41 16 11 209 
2009 0 27 72 16 0 32 7 11 165 
2010 1 53 88 12 0 31 14 14 213 
2011 1 48 69 16 1 31 16 12 194 
2012 0 44 85 11 0 39 11 15 205 
2013 0 51 58 7 0 33 8 16 173 
2014 0 55 89 15 0 51 19 16 245 
Total 2 474 741 112 1 339 110 127 1,906 























Count 2878582 1619 1906 1906 1612 1252 1906 1906 1022 
Mean 3.97 17747.36 0.44 0.86 0.12 3472.72 0.44 0.57 -0.03 











   
Count 1464 843 1906 1906 1906 1906    
Mean 2.07 0.42 0.10 0.01 0.45 0.39    







Table 2.2 Univariate analysis of investor attention around major corporate events 
This table compares investor AbnAttention around merger announcements with that on a quiet day. A quiet day is a firm-weekday that is outside the window 
[-5,5] in weekdays relative to corporate events (earnings announcements, merger announcements, and seasoned equity offering). In Panel A, I summarize 
investors' AbnAttention on a quiet day. In Panel B, I summarize investor AbnAttention to target firms and acquirer firms in window [-5,-1], [0], and [1,5] in 
weekdays relative to the merger announcements. In Panel C, I compare investor attention to AttTarget firms and that to AttAcquirer firms on the 
announcement. To test the difference in AbnAttention, I use two methods. I first perform simple difference test, and the standard errors are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. To best address this concern that transaction characteristics drive the difference, I also calculate Abadie and Imbens 
(2002) matching estimators by matching each AttTarget with an AttAcquirer firms that are closest regarding transaction size. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Panel A: AbnAttention on a quiet day (AbnAttention in %) 
Events Count Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Standard 
deviation 
Quiet day 2371346 3.67 -99.99 -10.89 1.89 15.65 313.87 29.09 
          
Panel B: AbnAttention around merger announcements (AbnAttention in %) 
Event Day[-5,-1] Event day: day [0] Day [1,5] 
  Mean Median 
DIF(mean-
mean on a 
quiet day) Mean Median 
DIF(mean-
mean on a 
quiet day) Mean Median 
DIF(mean-
mean on a 
quiet day) 
Merger announcements-AttTarget 5.333 2.570 1.660*** 18.289 8.750 14.62*** 7.374 3.607 3.701*** 
Merger announcements-AttAcquirer 3.191 1.967 -0.005 7.654 2.882 3.98*** 5.035 2.663 1.36*** 
          
Panel C: Comparison of AbnAttention to AttTarget firms and to AttAcquirer firms (AbnAttention in %) 
Role Count Mean Min P25 P50 P75 Max 
Standard 
deviation 
AttTarget 595 19.36 -59.43 -5.24 8.89 26.07 313.87 51.81 
AttAcquirer 1410 8.83 -99.99 -9.06 3.47 20.00 313.87 36.85 
Difference(AttTarget-AttAcquirer)   10.5***             





Table 2.3 Multivariate analysis of the timing and magnitude of investor attention around 
merger announcements 
This table presents the results of the model (1), which models the timing and magnitude of investor attention to 
merger announcements. The dependent variable is log (1+AbnAttention). I take the logarithm of AbnAttention to 
make the distribution of the variable close to normal. All variables are defined in Appendix 2.1. P values 
calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by day and by firm is reported in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1, 0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Log(1+AbnAttention) 
 Coefficient p-value 
Merger announcements-Target[-5,-1] 0.0571*** (0.000) 
Merger announcements-Target[0] 0.155*** (0.000) 
Merger announcements-Target[1,5] -0.00855 (0.728) 
Merger announcements-Acquirer[-5,-1] -0.00173 (0.934) 
Merger announcements-Acquirer[0] 0.0361 (0.174) 
Merger announcements-Acquirer[1,5] 0.0296**  (0.031) 
Earnings announcements[-5,-1] 0.0275*** (0.000) 
Earnings announcements[0] 0.0616*** (0.000) 
Earnings announcements[1,5] 0.0214*** (0.000) 
Seasoned equity offering[-5,1] 0.0420**  (0.035) 
Seasoned equity offering[0] 0.0409 (0.154) 
Seasoned equity offering[1,5] -0.017 (0.566) 
Macro news announcement day 0.0274*** (0.002) 
Firm size 0.00663*** (0.003) 
Book/Market -0.000227 (0.847) 
Lag(Abnormal return) 0.0111 (0.573) 
Lag(Volatility) -0.123*   (0.090) 
Lag(Trading volume) 4.004*** (0.000) 
Lag(Market return) -0.295*   (0.066) 
Day of week fixed effect YES  
Month of year fixed effect YES   
N 2841132   




Table 2.4 Cross-section of investor attention to AttTarget  
In this table, I analyze the determinants of investors' attention to AttTarget firms of merger announcements. 
Variable definitions are in Appendix 2.1.P values calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by day and by firm is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1, 
0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: Log(1+AbnAttention) 
 Coefficient p-value 
Acquirer characteristics   
Acquirer firm size 0.0212 (0.103) 
High-tech acquirer -0.00212 (0.967) 
Public acquirer -0.118** (0.022) 
Acquirer ROE -0.000355 (0.972) 
Target characteristics   
Target firm size 0.0258* (0.094) 
High-tech target 0.0284 (0.612) 
Target profitability (ROE) 0.00714 -0.826 
Deal characteristics   
Transaction value($billion) 0.00880*** (0.008) 
Offer premium 0.0537 (0.760) 
Tender offer(dummy) -0.0117 (0.850) 
Diversifying merger(Dummy) -0.0629 (0.189) 
All-cash deal(dummy) -0.0541 (0.313) 
Year fixed effect YES  
N 250  




Table 2.5 Univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on AttTarget 
announcement day return 
In this table, I perform univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on AttTarget announcement day 
return. I assign all the AttTarget firms into quartiles according to the AbnAttention they receive on the 
announcement date. For each group, I then calculate the average CAR[0,1] and test the difference in CAR[0,1] 
between the top quartile group and other groups. CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal return over the window 
[0,1] in trading days relative to the merger announcement day. When testing the difference in mean, standard 
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level, respectively. 
CAR[0,1] 
Rank of AbnAttention Count Mean Standard Deviation P25 P50 P75 
1 136 18.32 24.21 3.63 15.00 27.89 
2 133 19.45 24.41 4.45 13.65 28.75 
3 141 17.26 18.50 3.34 14.27 26.92 
4 145 23.82 31.27 6.64 17.18 32.48 























Table 2.6 Investor attention and stock return of AttTarget 
In this table, I analyze the determinants of announcement returns for AttTarget firms. High attention dummy 
equals to one if the attention is in the top quartile of AbnAttention and zero otherwise. CAR[0,1] is the 
cumulative abnormal return over the window [0,1] in trading days relative to the merger announcement day. All 
variable definitions are in Appendix 2.1. P values calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by day and by firm is reported in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicates statistical significance at 
0.1,0.05, and 0.1 level, respectively. 
Dependent variable: CAR[0,1] for target firm 
High attention(dummy) 0.0383** (0.027) 
Acquirer characteristics   
Acquirer firm size 0.00379 (0.355) 
High-tech acquirer -0.04 (0.146) 
Public acquirer -0.0068 (0.873) 
Acquirer ROE 0.00855* (0.055) 
Target characteristics   
Target firm size -0.0169** (0.016) 
High-tech target 0.0600** (0.023) 
Target profitability (ROE) 0.00344 (0.783) 
Deal characteristics   
Transaction value($billion) -0.00149* (0.098) 
Offer preium 0.504*** (0.000) 
Tender offer(dummy) 0.0284 (0.308) 
Diversifying merger(Dummy) -0.0411*** (0.009) 
All-cash deal(dummy) 0.0452** (0.029) 
Year fixed effect YES   
N 238  
















Table 2.7 Univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on announcement return 
for AttTarget 
In this table, I test if AttTargets’ announcement return affect investor attention. I assign AttTarget firms into 
quartiles according to their announcement return (CAR[0,1]), and then calculate average AbnAttention for each 
group. CAR[0,1] is the cumulative abnormal return over the window [0,1] in trading days relative to the merger 
announcement day. When testing the difference in mean, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
AbnAttention 
Rank of CAR[0,1] Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
P25 P50 P75 
1 136 18.64 52.84 -4.34 7.32 19.78 
2 139 20.64 54.52 -3.17 10.35 26.42 
3 138 16.05 45.77 -9.26 10.43 25.19 
4 142 22.34 51.84 -6.65 11.13 32.99 
























Table 2.8 Univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on trading volume for 
AttTarget 
In this table, I perform univariate analysis of the impact of investor attention on AttTarget trading volume. I 
assign all the AttTarget firms into quartiles according to the AbnAttention they receive on announcement date. 
For each group, I then calculate the average AbnTurnover and test the difference in AbnTurnover between the top 
quartile group and other groups. Abnormal trading volume measure (AbnTurnover) is the difference between 
turnover on a particular day and the average daily turnover over the past 252 trading days, skipping the most 
recent 20 trading days. When testing the difference in mean, standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity 
and clustered by date. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
AbnTurnover 
Rank of AbnAttention Count Mean 
Standard 
Deviation P25 P50 P75 
1 143 0.108 0.152 0.005 0.053 0.147 
2 146 0.129 0.172 0.009 0.069 0.176 
3 149 0.136 0.193 0.007 0.065 0.186 
4 149 0.216 0.232 0.049 0.151 0.308 























Table 2.9 Investor attention and trading volume of AttTarget 
In this table, I analyze the determinants of trading volume of AttTarget firms on the merger announcement day. 
High attention dummy equals to one if the attention is in the top quartile of AbnAttention and zero otherwise. 
Abnormal trading volume measure (AbnTurnover) is the difference between turnover on a particular day and the 
average daily turnover over the past 252 trading days, skipping the most recent 20 trading days. All variable 
definitions are in Appendix 2.1. P values calculated using standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
clustered by day and by firm is reported in parentheses. *,**, and *** indicates statistical significance at 0.1,0.05, 
and 0.1 level, respectively. 
 Dependent variable: AbnTurnover 
High attention(dummy) 0.0848*** (0.006) 
Acquirer characteristics   
Acquirer firm size 0.0173*** (0.001) 
High-tech acquirer 0.0587 (0.173) 
Public acquirer 0.00338 (0.960) 
Acquirer ROE 0.0101* (0.081) 
Target characteristics   
Target firm size 0.0245*** (0.001) 
High-tech target 0.0216 (0.617) 
Target profitability (ROE) 0.00321 (0.819) 
Deal characteristics   
Transaction value($billion) -0.00437*** (0.000) 
Offer preium 0.0685 (0.133) 
Tender offer(dummy) 0.0953** (0.043) 
Diversifying merger(Dummy) -0.019 (0.385) 
All-cash deal(dummy) 0.0211 (0.615) 
Year fixed effect YES   
N 247  



















A term’s likelihood of being searched on a day scaled by the highest daily likelihood 
over the period the user specifies, multiplied by 100 
AbnAttention 
The difference between daily SVI and the average SVI from day -360 to day -
31scaled by the average.  
LnAttention Log(AbnAttention+1) 
CAR[0,1] 
Cumulative abnormal return over the window [0,1] in trading days relative to the 
merger announcement day.  
Firm size Log(Market capitalization) 
Book/Market Book value/Market value 
Abnormal return DGTW characteristics-adjusted abnormal return 
Price volatility Absolute value of abnormal return 
Abnormal turnover 
The difference between turnover on a particular day and the average daily turnover 
for the past year, skipping the most recent month. 




Acquirers’ firm size Log(Net sales of the acquirer  in $million) 
High-tech acquirer 
An indicator variable that equals one if the acquirer firm is a high-tech firm according 
to SDC classification and zero otherwise. 
Public acquirer 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the acquirer is a public firm and zero 
otherwise 




Target firm size Log(Net sales of the target firm in $million) 
High-tech target 
An indicator variable that equals one if the target firm is a high-tech firm according to 
SDC classification and zero otherwise. 
Public target 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the target is a public firm and zero 
otherwise 













Appendix 2.1(continued): variable definitions  
Variable Definitions 
Deal characteristics  
Transaction value($million) Transaction value disclosed in SDC 
Offer premium 
(Initial offer price – target firms’ stock price on the day before the 
announcement)/target's stock price on the day before the announcement 
Tender offer 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the deal is a tender offer, and zero 
otherwise 
Diversifying merger 
An indicator variable that equals to one if the acquirer and the target are not in 
the same four-digit SIC code and zero otherwise 
All cash deal An indicator variable that equals to one if the deal is financed by 100% cash 
Event day indicator variables  
Merger announcements-
Target[i, j] 
An indicator variable for the window [i, j] in weekdays relative to the day when a 
firm is announced to be the target of a merger deal. 
Merger announcements-
Acquirer[i, j] 
An indicator variable for the window [i, j] in weekdays relative to the day when a 
firm is announced to be the acquirer of a merger deal. 
Earnings announcements[i, j] 
An indicator variable for the window [i, j] in weekdays relative to the earnings 
announcement date. 
Seasoned equity offering[i, j] 
An indicator variable for the window [i, j] in weekdays relative to the seasoned 
equity offering date. 
Macro news announcement 
day 
An indicator variable that equals one if one or more macro news is announced 

















3  Chapter 3: Investor attention, idiosyncratic volatility, and stock returns 
3.1 Introduction 
The relationship between idiosyncratic risk and stock return has been examined extensively and 
the evidence is mixed so far. According to capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964), 
Lintner (1965 a) and Black (1972), investors hold optimally diversified portfolios. Therefore, 
expected stock return should be related to only stocks’ exposure to systematic risk, and investors 
should not price idiosyncratic risk. This prediction is supported by Bali and Caciki (2008). Other 
theoretical work (Levy (1978), Merton (1987)) suggests that idiosyncratic volatility should be 
positively related to expected return given that investors do not hold the optimally diversified 
portfolio in an incomplete market and thus still care about the idiosyncratic risk. Supporting 
evidence is provided by Fu (2009), Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2010). Recently, an empirical 
paper by Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) document a strong negative relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and realized future return, which is commonly referred to as 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. A couple of explanations have been proposed for this puzzle. The 
most prominent one is based on investor’s lottery preference (see Chabi-Yo and Yang (2009), 
Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2010), Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011)). To the extent that 
idiosyncratic volatility is correlated with lottery characteristics such as skewness and maximum 
daily stock return, investors’ high demand for lottery-like stocks pushes up the stock prices 
temporarily, and the prices subsequently reverse.  
In this chapter, I examine the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and return with a 
particular interest in understanding the effect of investor attention. Many papers have suggested 




example, DellaVigna and Pollet (2009) and Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2009) has shown that 
when an earnings announcement attracts sufficient attention, the immediate price reaction is 
stronger, and post-earnings announcement drift is weaker. To the extent that investor attention 
sharpens investors’ reaction to information and that idiosyncratic risk is important public 
information that could affect stock prices, I expect the true relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and return to be more pronounced when investors pay attention.  
I employ an attention measure based on Google search volume, and the sample covers 2259 
stocks traded on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ between 2004 and 2014. As a first step, I 
conduct univariate analysis and find that the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and 
one-week ahead return is insignificant in the full sample. This is partially driven by the fact that 
my sample is biased towards large firms due to the availability of attention data. Using monthly 
data, Bali and Cakici (2008) document an insignificant relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and future stock return after excluding penny stocks. As the second step, I sort stocks 
into five by five portfolios according to the idiosyncratic volatility and investor attention. 
Surprisingly, a trading strategy that long the stocks in the highest idiosyncratic volatility 
portfolio and short the ones in the lowest idiosyncratic volatility portfolio generates a significant 
weekly raw return of 0.89% and a four factor adjusted alpha of -0.23% when investor attention is 
the highest. In the lowest attention quintile, the trading strategy generates a raw return of -0.18%, 
but the difference is insignificant. The four factor adjusted alpha is -0.23% and marginally 
significant. To control for other predictors of stock return, I also perform Fama-Macbeth 
regression, and the results remain unchanged. Furthermore, I show that the predictive power 




future stock return when investor attention is high, and the predictive power disappear when 
investor attention is low.  
There are two possible explanations for the results: risk premium and continued over-pricing. 
On one hand, it could be that when investors pay attention and realize that a stock has high 
idiosyncratic risk, they demand a risk premium and lower the contemporaneous stock prices. On 
the other hand, lottery preference-based explanation argues that investors prefer lottery-like 
stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility, and their high demand for such stocks drives up the 
contemporaneous stock price. It is possible that when investors pay attention to these stocks, they 
continue to be enthusiastic in the following week, and thus the prices further drift up.  
To differentiate between the two explanations, I then examine the long-run stock returns. If the 
positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and future return for high attention stocks is 
driven by investor’s behavioral bias, I should expect the price to subsequently reverse. However, 
I find no evidence of long-run price reversal.  
One concern is that the high IVOL, high attention, and higher stock return could all be driven 
by the same information. In this case, my result is merely capturing the association between 
IVOL and stock return rather than the causal relationship between the two. For example, 
earnings announcements could lead to higher volatility and attention. Assuming the high IVOL 
portfolios are dominated by the stocks with positive earnings announcements, the higher future 
stock returns could simply be the post-earnings announcement drift. To establish the causality 
between investor attention and the risk premium for IVOL, I then perform bivariate analysis 
based on dependent sorting. I first sort stocks into quintiles based on idiosyncratic volatility in 
week t-1 and then sort stocks into quintiles based on attention in week t within each group. I then 




magnitude in each IVOL quintile, I then capture the variations in investor attention rather than 
differences in the underlying events. I find that within the high IVOL group, future stock returns 
increase monotonically with investor attention, suggesting that higher attention leads to more 
positive relationship between IVOL and stock returns. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 3.2 provides a literature review. 
Section 3.3 describes the data, and Section 3.4 provide the results. Section 3.5 concludes.  
3.2 Literature review 
Whether and how investors price idiosyncratic risk is a topic that the literature has debated for 
long. Theories have predicted either insignificant or positive relationship. According to CAPM, a 
typical investor holds the optimally diversified portfolios. Therefore, only undiversifiable risk 
should be priced by investors, and diversifiable/idiosyncratic risk does not matter to them. 
Merton (1987), however, argues that unlike the theoretical assumptions, the real market is 
incomplete. Investors are not perfectly diversified, and thus idiosyncratic risk still affects their 
portfolio choice and stock price.  
The empirical evidence on this topic is also inconclusive. In a highly influential paper, Ang, 
Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang (2006) (hereafter referred to as AHXZ) find that stocks with lower 
idiosyncratic volatility earn higher average returns, a finding commonly referred “idiosyncratic 
puzzle.” Some follow-up papers provide explanations to this phenomenon. Bali and Cakici 
(2008) argue that the IVOL effect is not robust, and it is sensitive to the choice of weighting 
scheme, breakpoints, and the data frequency. They also show that the findings in AHXZ are 
mainly driven by small stocks. Another strand of literature argues that investors' lottery 
preferences drive the IVOL puzzle. Since high volatility is highly correlated with lottery 




prices for lottery-like stocks and thus, these stocks have lower returns in the future. Johnson 
(2005) argues that idiosyncratic risk is a proxy for uncertainty, and uncertainty is negatively 
related to future stock returns because of the call option feature of stock for the levered firm. Fu 
(2009) suggests that stocks’ idiosyncratic risk is time variant. Therefore, the past idiosyncratic 
risk is not a good proxy for expected idiosyncratic risk. He uses an exponential GARCH to 
estimate expected idiosyncratic volatility and find a positive relationship between expected 
idiosyncratic volatility and expected return.  He further argues that the results in AHXZ are 
largely explained by return reversal of a subset of small stocks with high idiosyncratic risk. 
Huang, Liu, Rhee, and Zhang (2010) also support the explanation based on a short-term reversal. 
Hou and Loh (2015) provide an evaluation of the existing explanations and conclude that a 
sizable portion of IVOL puzzle remains unresolved. However, they also argue that the lottery 
preference explanation and the short-term reversal explanation shows the most explanatory 
power among all the existing ones.  
My results show that the relationship between IVOL and stock return is not unanimous, and it 
is greatly affected by investor attention. They also cast doubt on the findings in Ang, Hodrick, 
Xing, and Zhang (2006) and the lottery preference-based explanation. I show that the 
idiosyncratic volatility puzzle only weakly exists in the low attention groups. Further, if the 
idiosyncratic puzzle exists and is caused by investors’ preference, I should expect the puzzle to 
be stronger when investors pay more attention. However, I find that the relationship is positive 
when investor attention is high.   
This chapter also contributes to this literature by suggesting that we should consider the effect 




idiosyncratic volatility in this chapter in particular. However, the logic can be extended to other 
anomalies as well.  
3.3 Data 
The sample covers all common stocks traded on NYSE and NASDAQ from January 1st, 2004 
to December 31st, 2014. I require stocks to have valid search data from Google Trends and the 
ticker to have no generic meaning. Security trading and price information are from CRSP 
database. The final sample consists of 751944 firm-weeks for 2343 firms. 
3.3.1 Measure of investor attention 
In this chapter, I employ weekly abnormal attention measure. It is defined as the difference 




𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑆𝑉𝐼𝑖,(𝑡−52,   𝑡−5)
− 1 
Similar to the daily abnormal attention measure, the weekly abnormal attention measure 
captures the deviation of attention from the normal level. For example, an AbnAttention value of 
30% indicates that the search interest in a particular week is 30% higher than its past average.  
3.3.2 Measure of idiosyncratic volatility 
Idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL) is defined as the standard deviation of daily abnormal returns 
over the past 21 trading days. Following Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1997), 
abnormal return is defined as the difference between a stock’s return and that of a size and book-
to-market matched portfolio. For each week, I take the idiosyncratic volatility measure of the last 




3.3.3 Other variables 
To allow for enough time for information dissemination, I use IVOL or attention in week t to 
predict return in t+1. To allow for enough time for information dissemination, I define return in 
week t+1 as holding period return from Wednesday in week t+1 to Wednesday in week t+2. Both 
raw return and the Cahart four factor model alpha are examined.  
I include a large set of control variables in the tests. Unless otherwise stated, I use the value on 
the last day as the weekly measure.  
I estimate stocks’ market beta using daily returns over the previous 252 trading days. The 
stock’s size is computed as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization at the end of each 
week. Book-to-market at the end of each June is computed as the last book value in the previous 
year scaled by the market value of equity at the end of December. Momentum is the cumulative 
return of a stock over the previous 11 months ending one month before the portfolio formation 
month. Illiquidity is the average Amihud illiquidity over each week. Following Amihud (2002), 
the daily illiquidity is measured as the absolute stock return to the dollar trading volume. Stock’s 
monthly co-skewness is constructed as in Harvey and Siddique (2000). It is defined as the 
estimate of γi in the regression using the daily return observations over the prior 21 trading days: 
Ri,d-rf,d=αi+βi (Rm,d-rf,d) +γi (Rm,d-rf,d)
2+ϵi,d 
Short-term reversal is defined as the stock return over the previous 21 trading days. Price is the 
price per share at the end of a week. Following Bali, Cakici, and Whitelaw (2011), the firm’s 
extreme positive return (MAX) is defined as the average of five highest daily returns over the 
past 21 days. Turnover is the average turnover in the previous week.  




Table 3.1 provides the summary statistics of the aforementioned variables. The median 
AbnAttention is -1% and the median is 9%, suggesting that the variable is right skewed by 
construction. The median (mean) firm size in my sample is $1.052 billion ($6.96 billion) 
suggesting that the sample is biased towards large firms. This is because large firms are more 
likely to be searched by investors and have valid attention data in Google Trends.  
3.4 Results 
In this section, I present the empirical results. In the first step, I perform univariate analysis to 
study the predictive power of investor attention or IVOL on stock return. As a second step, I 
perform bivariate analysis to study the effect of investor attention on the relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and stock return.  
3.4.1 Univariate portfolio-level analysis 
For each week, I sort all the stocks into quintiles based on AbnAttention or IVOL and then 
compare the stock returns in the following week. I present results based on equal-weighted 
portfolio in Table 3.2 and results based on value-weighted portfolio in Table 3.3. In each table, I 
present the one-week ahead return for portfolios formed on AbnAttention in panel A and return 
for portfolio formed on idiosyncratic volatility in panel B.  
Panel A shows that investor attention significantly positively predicts one-week ahead stock 
return. The difference in raw return between the highest AbnAttention quintile and the lowest 
AbnAttention quintile is 0.34%, which translates to 17.68% annual return. The difference in 
four-factor adjusted abnormal return is also positively significant. Consistent with Da, 
Engelberg, and Gao (2011), the results suggest that investor attention positively predicts stock 
return in the following week. Barber and Odean (2008) argue that this is because retail investors 




Panel B shows that the difference in return between the highest IVOL quintile and the lowest 
IVOL quintile is 0.12% but insignificant. The difference in abnormal return is also positive and 
insignificant. It suggest that the IVOL effect does not exist in my full sample. Bali and Cakici 
(2008) argue that the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility is insignificant in equal weight 
scheme and significantly negative in value-weight scheme. To assure that my results are not 
driven by the choice of weighting scheme, I then report results for value weighted portfolios in 
Table 3.3. The results indicate a positive and significant relationship between investor attention 
and future stock return but insignificant relationship between IVOL and future stock return.  
3.4.2 Bivariate portfolio-level analysis 
As discussed earlier, attention is a crucial condition for investors to incorporate information 
about idiosyncratic volatility into stock prices. In this section, I perform bivariate analysis to 
examine the effect of investor attention the relationship between IVOL and future stock return.  
In each week, I sort stocks into quintiles based on IVOL and investor attention independently 
and compare one-week ahead returns of each portfolio. The results are reported in Table 3.4. In 
the top attention quintile, the return difference between the high- and low-IVOL portfolios is 
0.89% per week and significant at 1% based on the Newey-West T statistics. The difference in 
alpha is 0.87% per week and also significant at 1% level.  In the bottom quintile, the raw return 
difference is -0.18% but insignificant based on Newey-West T statistics. The difference in alpha 
is -0.23% and marginally significant.  
The result suggests that when investor attention is high, IVOL is positively related to the one-
week ahead stock return. When investor attention is low, however, the relationship is negative 




3.4.3 Fama-Macbeth regression analysis 
Attention is correlated with other return predictors documented in the prior literature such as 
size, trading volume, and past stock returns. To assure that my results are not driven by other 
factors, I also perform Fama-Macbeth regression analysis. Each week, I regress one-week ahead 
DGTW abnormal return on AbnAttention, IVOL, the interaction term of the two, and a set of 
controls. The regression coefficients are then averaged over time, and standard errors are 
computed using Newey-West (1987) formula. The controls include beta, size, book/market, 
momentum, illiquidity, conditional skewness, short-term reversal, past highest price, maximum 
daily return, trading volume.  
Returni,t+1=α0+α1ATTi,t*IVOLi,t+α2ATTi,t+ α3IVOLi,t+ α4Controlsi,t+ϵi,t 
The analysis in the previous section suggests that higher attention leads to the positive 
relationship between IVOL and future stock return. Thus, I expect α1 to be positive and 
significant. The results are reported in Table 3.5. As is shown in Column 1, the coefficient on the 
interaction dummy is 0.0969, suggesting that, as investor attention increases, the positive 
relationship between IVOL and future stock return is stronger. Consistent with the result from 
univariate analysis, the coefficient on AbnAttention is 0.2584, suggesting that the higher 
attention leads to higher future stock return. The coefficient on IVOL is -0.0072 but 
insignificant. This supports my findings in the univariate sort that the relationship between IVOL 
and future stock return is insignificant in the full sample. In Column 2, I added Cahart four 
factors including market beta, firm size, book-to-market, and momentum, and in Colum 3, I also 
more factors that are documented in the prior literature. The results remain unchanged. Overall, 




attention increase, the relationship between IVOL and future stock return becomes significantly 
positive.   
3.4.4 Horizons of the predictive power 
To gain insights on the length of the predictive power of IVOL on future stock return, I also 
perform Fama-Macbeth regressions using future stock returns at longer horizons (up to four 
weeks) as dependent variables. The results are reported in Table 3.6. As is shown, the 
coefficients on the interaction term are positive and significant for two weeks, and then they 
become positive but insignificant. This suggests that when investor attention is high, higher 
IVOL predicts a higher stock return for up to two weeks.  
3.5 Investigating the underlying mechanisms 
3.5.1 Long-run return difference 
My previous analysis suggests that when investor attention is high, IVOL positively predicts 
future stock return. In this section, I explore two possible explanations: continued over-pricing 
and risk premium. Several papers argue that IVOL is highly correlated with lottery 
characteristics such as skewness and maximum daily stock return. Investors’ preference for 
lottery-like stocks tends to drive up the stock price temporarily. It is possible that when investor 
attention is high, their demand for high IVOL stocks persists for longer. Therefore, the stock 
price continues to drift up for a few more weeks. When investor attention is low, demand dies 
down quickly and thus the price reverse in the following week. On the other hand, it could be 
that when investor attention is high, they realize the idiosyncratic risk and demand premium 
accordingly. Merton (1987) argue that markets are incomplete, and investors face frictions and 
hold poorly diversified portfolios. Therefore, they view idiosyncratic risk as one that needs to be 




To explore the potential mechanism, I then examine the long-run return performance. If 
continued over-pricing drives the result, I should expect a long-run price reversal. However, if 
the result is driven by risk-return tradeoff, I expect the price change to be permanent. I plot the 
difference in raw return between high- and low- IVOL portfolios in the highest AbnAttention 
group for up to a half year (27 weeks). The plot is shown in Figure 3.1. Consistent with the 
results from Fama-Macbeth regression, the return difference is quite positive in the first few 
weeks, indicating that high IVOL positively predict future return when investor attention is high. 
In the long run, however, the return does not reverse. The result suggests that the return is 
informative and permanent. Thus, it supports the explanation based on risk-return tradeoff. 
3.5.2 Establishing causality: dependent sort 
One concern with the previous analysis is that the high IVOL, high attention, and higher stock 
return could all be driven by the same information. In this case, my result is merely capturing the 
association between IVOL and stock return, rather than the causal relationship between the two. 
For example, earnings announcements could lead to higher volatility and attention. Assuming the 
high IVOL portfolios are dominated by the stocks with positive earnings announcements, the 
higher future stock returns could simply be the post-earnings announcement drift. To establish 
the causality between investor attention and the risk premium for IVOL, I need to show that 
when investors pay attention to high IVOL stocks, they demand risk premium accordingly. To do 
this, I then perform dependent bivariate sort with lead-lag in timing. Specifically, in each week, I 
sort stocks into quintiles based on IVOL. Within each IVOL quintile, I then sort stocks into 
quintiles based on attention in week t+1. I then examine the stock return in week t+2. Assuming 
the IVOL is caused by information of similar magnitude in each IVOL quintile, I capture only 




are shown in Table 3.7. As is shown, in each IVOL group, higher attention predicts higher future 
stock returns, and the difference is the biggest in the highest IVOL group. These results suggest 
that when investors notice the high IVOL, they demand a risk premium. The higher the IVOL is, 
the more premium investors demand.  
People could argue that the return difference between high attention and low-attention stocks is 
simply driven by the attention effect, not the risk premium. Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) has 
shown that attention positively predicts stock returns in the subsequent weeks. If the results are 
simply driven by attention, I should not expect any difference between the low- and high-IVOL 
groups. However, as is shown, the magnitude of the return difference increases with IVOL. Also, 
as Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) show, the price pressure from high investor attention tends to 
reverse in the long-run. As I show in the previous section, there is no long-run reversal in the 
price changes. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This chapter studies the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and future stock return 
with a particular interest in understanding the effect of investor attention.  I document that when 
investor attention is high, idiosyncratic volatility positively predicts future stock return. 
However, when investor attention is low, the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and 
future stock return is insignificant. In the long run, the return difference does not reverse. The 
result provides strong support to the argument in Merton (1987) that in an incomplete market, 
investors hold sub-optimally diversified portfolio and therefore demand a risk premium for 






Table 3.1 Summary statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the paper. I start with all the common stocks listed 
on NYSE and NASDAQ between 2004 and 2014 and require the security to have information about investors' 
search activity in Google Trends and security and fundamental information in the COMPUSTAT-CRSP merged 
database. The final sample consists of 751,944 firm-weeks for 2343 firms listed on NYSE and NASDAQ firms. 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix 3.1.  
  N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
AbnAttention 751944 0.09 0.92 -0.37 -0.17 -0.01 0.1 0.37 
Beta 751944 1.09 0.55 0.38 0.73 1.08 1.44 1.78 
Size ($million) 751944 6960.52 24121.02 50.41 216.93 1052.72 3860.04 14490.75 
Book/Market 718180 0.65 0.76 0.17 0.3 0.49 0.77 1.19 
Momentum 751689 12.26 64.38 -43.84 -17.83 6.15 30.25 63.27 
Illiquidity  745087 0.19 6.94 0 0 0 0 0.04 
IVOL 751938 2.18 2.13 0.72 1.03 1.61 2.6 4.13 
COSKEW 751938 -2.32 107.06 -75.07 -25.46 -0.73 22.52 67.71 
Reversal 751938 1.26 16.09 -13.72 -5.53 0.83 7.02 15.19 
Price 751944 66.47 1955.75 2.79 7.9 20.9 39.2 60.08 
MAX 751944 3.59 3.21 1.26 1.8 2.75 4.28 6.63 




















Table 3.2 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention or IVOL: equal 
weighted portfolios 
Each week, I form quintile portfolios based on AbnAttention (Panel A) or IVOL (Panel B) and calculate the equal 
weighted average raw returns or four-factor adjusted alpha for each portfolio in the following week. Newey-West 
(1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A: by AbnAttention 
ATT 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High-Low 
Mean 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.45 0.34 
 (0.75) (1.26) (1.53) (1.74) (2.75) (8.37) 
FFC alpha -0.06 0.02 0.06 0.09 0.28 0.34 
  (-1.91) (0.60) (2.04) (3.09) (6.12) (9.20) 
Panel B: by IVOL 
IVOL 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High-Low 
Mean 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.30 0.12 
 (1.91) (1.80) (1.70) (1.47) (1.40) (0.79) 
FFC alpha 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.05 




















Table 3.3 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention or IVOL: value 
weighted portfolios 
Each week, I form quintile portfolios based on AbnAttention (Panel A) or IVOL (Panel B) and 
calculate the value weighted average raw returns or four-factor adjusted alpha for each portfolio in the 
following week. Newey-West (1987) adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  
Panel A: by AbnAttention 
ATT 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High-Low 
Mean 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.17 0.23 0.19 
 (0.39) (1.53) (0.87) (1.55) (1.80) (2.53) 
FFC alpha -0.10 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.09 0.19 
  (-3.65) (1.00) (-1.69) (1.19) (1.67) (2.66) 
Panel B: by IVOL 
IVOL 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High-Low 
Mean 0.14 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.26 0.12 
 (1.56) (1.39) (1.42) (0.78) (1.17) (0.71) 
FFC alpha 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.02 





















Table 3.4 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention and IVOL: 
equal-weighted portfolios 
Each week, I sort stocks into one of the five by five IVOL and AbnAttention quintiles and then calculate the 
equal-weighted average return in week t+1 for each portfolio. When computing the difference in returns between 
high- and low IVOL or between high- and low-AbnAttention, the standard error is adjusted using Newey-West 
(1987) method. T-statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
  AbnAttention 
IVOL 1 (Low) 2 3 4 5 (High) High-Low 
1 (Low) 0.13 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.11 
2 0.24 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.23 -0.02 
3 0.16 0.21 0.29 0.25 0.38 0.22 
4 0.06 0.23 0.22 0.30 0.47 0.41 
5 (High) -0.05 0.09 0.22 0.31 0.95 1.00 
High-Low -0.18 -0.10 0.07 0.10 0.72 0.89 
  (-1.25) (-0.65) (0.50) (0.62) (3.19) (6.17) 
FFC alpha -0.23 -0.15 0.02 0.03 0.64 0.87 






















Table 3.5 Fama-Macbeth regression: predict one-week ahead returns 
Each week I run a cross-sectional regression of the one-week ahead return on AbnAttention, IVOL, and the 
interaction between the two. In Column (2) and Column (3), I also add six control variables that are defined in 
Appendix 3.1. I then take the time-series average of the coefficients and calculate the t statistics (reported in the 
parentheses) adjusted using Newey-West (1987) method.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
AbnAttention * IVOL 0.0969 0.1023 0.1098 
 (6.57) (6.25) (6.71) 
AbnAttention 0.2584 0.2534 0.2688 
 (7.11) (5.64) (5.81) 
BETA  0.0447 0.0892 
  (0.50) (1.03) 
SIZE  -0.0389 -0.0227 
  (-2.61) (-1.95) 
BM  -0.0068 -0.0063 
  (-0.29) (-0.28) 
MOM  -0.0003 -0.0002 
  (-0.34) (-0.22) 
ILLIQ   0.0233 
   (0.50) 
IVOL -0.0072 -0.0145 0.0173 
 (-0.37) (-0.84) (0.54) 
COSKEW   -0.0001 
   (-0.08) 
REV   -0.0005 
   (-0.17) 
PRC   -0.0323 
   (-1.07) 
MAX   -0.0255 
   (-0.96) 
TURN   -0.0214 
      (-1.20) 
Intercept 0.2273 0.3811 0.3485 
  (1.81) (2.58) (2.33) 
Obs 1,489 1,421 1,408 










Table 3.6 Fama-Macbeth regression: predict one-, two-, three-, four-week ahead returns 
Each week, I run a cross-sectional regression of the one-, two-, three-, and four- week ahead stock return on 
AbnAttention, IVOL, the interaction term of the two, and controls defined in Appendix 3.1. I then take the time-
series average of the coefficients and calculate the t statistics (reported in the parentheses) adjusted using Newey-
West (1987) method.  
  One-week ahead Two-week ahead 
Three-week 
ahead Four-week ahead 
AbnAttention * IVOL 0.1098 0.0292 0.0176 0.0046 
 (6.71) (2.30) (1.66) (0.51) 
AbnAttention 0.2688 0.0476 0.0304 0.0066 
 (5.81) (2.72) (2.05) (0.48) 
BETA 0.0892 0.0927 0.0562 0.0473 
 (1.03) (1.13) (0.67) (0.57) 
SIZE -0.0227 -0.0174 -0.0173 -0.0123 
 (-1.95) (-1.60) (-1.56) (-1.14) 
BM -0.0063 -0.0150 -0.0138 -0.0094 
 (-0.28) (-0.69) (-0.63) (-0.41) 
MOM -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 
 (-0.22) (0.01) (-0.15) (0.00) 
ILLIQ 0.0233 0.0508 0.0379 0.0714 
 (0.50) (1.16) (0.73) (1.37) 
IVOL 0.0173 -0.0326 -0.0106 -0.0039 
 (0.54) (-1.09) (-0.36) (-0.14) 
COSKEW -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (-0.08) (-1.06) (-0.37) (-0.57) 
REV -0.0005 0.0022 0.0002 0.0014 
 (-0.17) (0.78) (0.06) (0.56) 
PRC -0.0323 -0.0236 -0.0031 -0.0152 
 (-1.07) (-0.85) (-0.12) (-0.56) 
MAX -0.0255 0.0045 0.0002 -0.0169 
 (-0.96) (0.18) (0.01) (-0.72) 
TURN -0.0214 -0.0223 -0.0184 -0.0200 
  (-1.20) (-1.33) (-0.90) (-1.08) 
Intercept 0.3485 0.2896 0.2167 0.2663 
  (2.33) (1.97) (1.51) (1.89) 
Obs 1,408 1,407 1,406 1,404 







Figure 3.1 Difference in return between high and low IVOL portfolios in the highest 
AbnAttention quintile 
Each week, I sort stocks into five by five portfolios based on AbnAttention and IVOL and calculate the return 
difference in the following 27 weeks between the high- and low-IVOL groups in the highest AbnAttention 
quintile. I then take the time series average of the differences. The solid line shows the average and the dotted line 
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Table 3.7 One-week ahead returns for portfolios formed on AbnAttention and lag 
idiosyncratic volatility: equal-weighted portfolios 
In each week t, I sort stocks into quintiles based on IVOL in the week t-1 and within each IVOL quintile, sort 
stocks into quintiles based on AbnAttention in week t. Then, I calculate the equal-weighted average return in 
week t+1 for each of the 25 portfolios. When computing the difference in returns between high- and low IVOL or 
between high- and low-AbnAttention, the standard error is adjusted using Newey-West (1987) method. T-
statistics are reported in the parentheses.  
 Abnormal Attention 
IVOL 1(Low) 2 3 4 5(High) High-Low 
1(Low) 0.20 0.24 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.06* 
 (2.15) (2.45) (1.81) (2.55) (2.50) (1.67) 
2 0.24 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.26 0.03 
 (1.87) (1.72) (1.85) (2.22) (2.01) (0.74) 
3 0.24 0.28 0.30 0.26 0.41 0.16*** 
 (1.64) (1.83) (1.79) (1.65) (2.66) (3.34) 
4 0.14 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.53 0.38*** 
 (0.82) (1.29) (1.47) (1.59) (2.72) (5.92) 
5(High) -0.02 0.20 0.30 0.32 0.91 0.93*** 
 (-0.09) (0.97) (1.30) (1.51) (3.03) (5.84) 
High-Low -0.22 -0.04 0.15 0.08 0.65*** 0.87*** 













Appendix 3.1 Variable definitions 
 
AbnAttention The difference between a stock’s weekly SVI and its average SVI from week t-52 to week t-5 
scaled by the past average 
Beta Market beta estimated using daily returns over the previous 252 trading days 
Size The natural logarithm of the market capitalization at the end of each week 
Book/market The last book value in the previous year scaled by the market value of equity at the end of 
December 
Momentum The cumulative return of a stock over the previous 11 months ending one month before the 
portfolio formation month 
Illiquidity The average Amihud illiquidity over each week 
IVOL Standard deviation of daily abnormal returns over the past 21 trading days 
COSKEW Co-skewness as in Harvey and Siddique (2000) 
Reversal Stock return over the previous 21 trading days 
Price Price per share at the end of a week 
MAX Average of five highest daily returns over the past 21 days 
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